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ABSTRACT
Scholars and practitioners alike share a widespread belief that the single
greatest cause of wrongful conviction is erroneous eyewitness testimony. This
conventional wisdom is almost certainly wrong. Conversational testimony-
describing earlier conversations or statements-is more common, more likely to be
inaccurate, more likely to be believed by jurors, and more likely to produce
irreversible errors than eyewitness testimony. Nonetheless, the dangers to the
innocent posed by conversational testimony have been largely unrecognized. This
Article highlights the case for further psychological and legal attention to
conversational witnesses by comparing how the psychological processes and legal
responses differ between eyewitness and conversational testimony. The Article
concludes with implications for reform that may minimize the ongoing and
unrecognized miscarriages of justice which result from erroneous conversational
testimony.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars and practitioners alike share a widespread belief that the single greatest
cause of wrongful conviction is erroneous eyewitness testimony.1 This conven-
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1. Two leading experts on eyewitness identification assert that "mistaken eyewitnesses account for more
convictions of innocent persons than all other causes combined." Henry L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 149 (Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B.
Weiner eds., 2003). Others are less extravagant but commonly opine that eyewitness mistakes are "the leading
cause of convictions of the innocent." Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing
Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2005). See also PATRICK M. WALL, EYEwITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (1965) ("The major problem, where actual guilt or innocence is involved,
has been and is now the problem posed by evidence of eye-witness identification."); Brandon L. Garrett,
Innocence, Harmless Error and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 79 ("[Mlistaken
eyewitness identifications have long been the leading cause of wrongful convictions .... "); Samuel R. Gross et
al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003,95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIuMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) ("The
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tional wisdom is almost certainly wrong. The reason it is wrong is not that
eyewitnesses are more reliable than is commonly believed. On the contrary, DNA
exonerations have powerfully demonstrated that eyewitness evidence is far less
reliable than the system assumes. Of those who have been exonerated by DNA
evidence, almost 80% were falsely identified by eyewitnesses.2 FBI analysis of
thousands of DNA samples in eyewitness cases supports the claim that as many as
25% of disputed eyewitness identifications may be erroneous. 3 Rather, the com-
mon belief that eyewitness testimony is the major cause of erroneous convictions
is wrong for two other reasons: (1) although unreliable, disputed eyewitness
identification is rarely involved in criminal prosecutions, and therefore eyewitness
error plays a determinative role in only a small fraction of criminal prosecutions;
and (2) prosecutions much more commonly rely on evidence that is even less
reliable than eyewitness accounts, 4 namely, "conversational" testimony-
testimony about what the defendant or his agent said or what was said to him on an
earlier occasion. This sort of evidence is present in almost all criminal trials as
speech acts (e.g., false or fraudulent statements, offers to buy or sell contraband,
bribes, threats), as proof of guilty knowledge (e.g., information imparted verbally
most common cause of wrongful convictions is eyewitness misidentification. This is not news."). The Supreme
Court virtually endorsed this view in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (quoting WALL, supra). It is
true that eyewitness error is present in most of the cases of proven false convictions, because eyewitness cases are
among the few that are amenable to positive proof of the defendant's innocence, but that does not warrant any
conclusions about the prevalence of outcome error in the totality of criminal convictions. Generalizing from the
causes of proven exonerations, perhaps one out of every 50,000 convictions, see Gross et al., supra at 527, to the
universe of criminal convictions has dire implications for reform since it diverts attention from far more pervasive
problems, such as the subject of this article.
2. Out of the first 62 DNA exonerations, 52 involved mistaken eyewitness identification. JIm DWYER, PETER
NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXEcImoN AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED app. a (2000). The Cardozo Innocence Project reports on its website that of 130 DNA
exonerations, 101 involved eyewitness misidentification. The Innocence Project, Causes and Remedies, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php. See also BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWrrNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 8, 265-68 (1995).
3. The FBI in 1989 began collecting and testing biological samples in sexual assault cases where the identity of
the perpetrator was disputed. Of 8,000 cases in which DNA samples could inculpate or exonerate the defendant,
2,000 or 25% resulted in exoneration of the suspect. See Peter Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, Commentary by Peter
Neufeld, Esq. and Barry C. Scheck, in CoNvicTED BY JURIEs, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE (1996). There is little
reason to suppose that eyewitness identifications in sexual assault cases are erroneous in substantially greater
proportions than in other eyewitness cases. Compared to robberies, e.g., the victim/witness is usually at close
range with the perpetrator for a considerable period of time, providing ample opportunity, and motive, to observe
his features closely. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 531 (suggesting that robberies, which are far more common
than rapes, probably produce more convictions of the innocent than rape prosecutions, despite the rarity of
robbery exonerations).
4. There are other candidates for "leading causes of wrongful convictions." One is ineffective assistance of
defense counsel, which many believe to be pervasive. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The
Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv.
Am. L. 783; Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer: Zealous Advocate, Double Agent or Beleaguered
Dealer?, 28 CRiM. L. BULL. 419 (1992). In terms of testimony, however, there can be little doubt that
conversational testimony is the leading cause, since it includes not only perjured but mistaken testimony, and not
only testimony about conversations in the usual sense of the word but also the results of police interrogations.
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to the defendant, statements by the defendant acknowledging awareness of
illegality), and as incriminating admissions of the defendant or an agent (e.g., oral
statements acknowledging that certain acts occurred or were authorized).
The dangerous inaccuracy of eyewitnesses and the inordinate credence given to
them by jurors have been well studied in both legal and psychological literature. In
the last five years, there have been more than 400 articles in the psychological
literature and 500 articles in the legal literature regarding eyewitness credibility
and accuracy.5 This tremendous amount of attention is due not only to the common
belief that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convic-
tions,6 but also to the concomitant awareness that an eyewitness mistake often
immunizes a guilty perpetrator.
While concern about eyewitness error preceded DNA testing,7 it has been
greatly fueled by DNA exonerations. However, the availability of DNA evidence
as a "gold standard" to measure conviction accuracy is mostly limited to violent
crimes by unknown perpetrators and, within that small set of cases, to those in
which the perpetrator left a biological specimen. While virtually all DNA exonera-
tions involve rape and murder convictions, most crimes are property crimes (e.g.,
thefts, frauds, forgeries) or "victimless" crimes (e.g., illicit drug transactions,
nonviolent sex crimes) in which the perpetrator is either known to the victim or
leaves a paper or electronic trail. Even violent crimes are more often committed by
acquaintances of the victim where eyewitness identification is not an issue.8 In
fact, a survey of state prosecutors revealed that eyewitness testimony is a central
factor in only 3% of felony trials, 9 a figure seemingly consistent with the fact that
16.8% of cases handled by state prosecutors are violent crimes.1t Virtually all
cases in which eyewitness identification is an important issue are those involving
violent crimes against strangers. Since most violent crimes are committed against
persons who know each other, that leaves less than 9% of felonies in which
5. As recorded by PSYCInfo, http://www.apa.org/psycinfo/, and Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com, data-
bases.
6. See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 2, at 267 (discussing possible causes of eyewitness misidentification);
DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 2, at app. a (charting factors leading to wrongful conviction; in 62 cases,
52 were mistaken identifications).
7. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (discussing eyewitness misidentification in 1967, many
years before DNA technology was perfected); see generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); C. Ronald Huff,
Wrongful Conviction: Societal Tolerance ofInjustice, 9 RES. IN Soc. PROBS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 103 (1987).
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 43a (2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/cvO443a.pdf (55% of violent crimes are committed by non-
strangers).
9. Alvin G. Goldstein et al., Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases, 27 BULL. OF
PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 71 (1989). Of course, the great majority of convictions are obtained not by trial but by guilty
plea and some of the guilty pleas doubtless are entered where identity is an issue. It seems extremely unlikely,
however, that the percentage of guilty plea cases involving identity issues is larger than the 3% at trial.
10. JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1996 (July 1999), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fsus96.pdf.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 3 2007
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1
identification could conceivably be an issue. It seems likely that in no more than
one-third of those cases is identification in serious dispute." Wrongful convictions
based on eyewitness testimony generate headline attention far out of proportion to
their actual incidence.
Testimony about conversations plays a pivotal role in a far more common and
broader range of cases, as will be elaborated upon in Part II. It should be noted
here, however, that problematic conversational testimony is by no means limited to
criminal trials; it extends to securities class actions, 2 interpretation of contracts,13
trusts and estates, 14 and even guardianship and medical care decision-making. 5
Further, the "rule against hearsay" does not greatly limit prosecutions where
out-of-court statements incriminating the defendant are used to convict him.
Anything a defendant or his agent said to anyone, at any time, under virtually any
circumstance, can, as far as the hearsay rule is concerned, be received into
evidence against him in a criminal trial. 16 In addition, a wide array of hearsay
exceptions often permits the prosecution to offer hearsay evidence of out-of-court
conversations in which neither the defendant nor his agent was even present. 17 For
example, conversations between an adult (e.g., a parent or a therapist) and a child,
allegedly a victim of sexual abuse, are often admitted, under a variety of hearsay
exceptions, to prove that the abuse occurred.' 8 These hearsay exceptions, however,
operate only one way. What the defendant or his agent said that makes the
11. The percentage of cases where eyewitness testimony is a central factor is likely even far lower in the
thousands of criminal cases processed through the federal system, in which violent crimes constitute a mere
5.78% of the total cases. See id.
12. THoMAs G. SHAPiRO, New Dimensions in Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies, C938 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY 205, 259 (1994) ("Did you have a meeting? What did you say? What did she say? What did he
say? And the like. That's how conversation testimony has come in evidence.")
13. E.g., William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of
Written Contracts, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 931, 937 (2001) (explaining that juries must often evaluate conversational
testimony regarding, e.g., course of performance in contract cases).
14. E.g., Michael K. Moyers, Survey of Ilinois Law: Trusts and Estates, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 959, 966 (1996)
(discussing a trust and estates case involving the admissibility of conversational testimony).
15. E.g., Anna Schork Fraleigh, An Alternative to Guardianship: Should Michigan Statutorily Allow Acute-
Care Hospitals to Make Medical Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients Who Have Neither Identifiable
Surrogates Nor Advance Directives?, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1079, 1092 (1999) (considering testimony
regarding conversations Nancy Cruzan had with family and friends as evidence of her intent in the pivotal
right-to-die Supreme Court case).
16. See FED. R. EvtD. 801(d)(2)(A). The rule is the same in civil cases. See also FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(C),
(D), (E); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (holding that the judge determines any facts necessary
for the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay and these facts need not be proven by admissible evidence).
17. FED. R. EviD. 803 lists 23 hearsay exceptions. FED. R. EvID. 804(b) lists 5 more. In addition, many
out-of-court statements, such as verbal acts or declarations evidencing the speaker's state of mind, are not
considered hearsay. FED. R. EvtD. 801.
18. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(2) (excited utterance exception), 803(3) (exception for a statement evidencing
then mental, emotional or physical condition), 803(4) (exception for a statement for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment). In addition to the dangers associated with a hearsay account of interactions between an
adult and a child, the admissibility of such testimony rests on the assumption that "in the absence of direct malice
or motives to lie, adults can accurately recall earlier conversations with children." Maggie Brck, Stephen J. Ceci
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defendant look guilty is admissible; what they said that makes him look innocent,
along with out-of-court statements of disinterested witnesses or third parties, are
usually excluded as hearsay.19
Despite its frequency, the reliability and credulity of conversational testimony is
virtually ignored in scholarly materials. Major textbooks on psychology and law
address the role of memory in legal contexts almost exclusively with respect to
eyewitnesses, as if this were the only memory relevant in the courtroom. Very little
research has addressed conversational testimony per se.2° Indeed, in contrast to the
various safeguards in place for assuring the reliability of other types of evidence
there are virtually none for the conversational witness aside from swearing in. For
example, an expert's credentials must be assessed and her testimony judged
"helpful" to be admissible and even eyewitness accounts are not admissible if
unreliable; there is no judicial authority, however, to exclude relevant but unreli-
able conversational testimony.
Our judicial system rests on a set of assumptions about the ability of witnesses
and the capacities of jurors. Our experiences with eyewitness fallibility demon-
strate that such assumptions often turn out to be erroneous, resulting in serious
injustices. Testimony about conversations that allegedly occurred two, ten or even
& Emmett Francoeur, The Accuracy of Mothers'Memories of Conversations with Their Preschool Children, 5 J.
ExPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 89, 89 (1999). This may not be a solid assumption. Id.
19. Even when another person has confessed to the crime, the confession will normally not be admissible. It is
admissible only if (1) the speaker is unavailable and his unavailability was not procured by the defendant, (2) the
confession exposed the speaker to criminal liability and (3) "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). In contrast, no reliability or trustworthiness tests are
imposed on hearsay offered by the prosecution, so long as it can be attributed to the defendant or his agent.
20. J. Don Read, Deborah Connolly, and John W. Turtle, Memory in Legal Contexts: Remembering Events,
Circumstances, and People, in INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES, 95,
95-126 (Regina A. Schuller & James R.P. Ogloff eds., 2001). This is the only chapter on memory and it focuses
exclusively on eyewitnesses. Id. Michael M. Gruneberg, Peter E. Morris, and Robert N. Sykes, in their definitive
2-volume PRACTICAL ASPECT'S OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES (1988), devote large sections to
eyewitnessing, child witnesses, and face recognition, but not a single article on memory for conversations or
verbal events appears. Behavioral scientists are not the only group of scholars who have neglected the problem of
conversational witnesses. In a recent comprehensive study culminating in detailed recommendations for reforms,
a group of Canadian prosecutors failed to mention any concern about conversational witness memory or even the
risk of false conversational testimony, other than that involving confessions and in-custody informers. FPT HEADS
OF PROSECUTIONS COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2004)
[hereinafter MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE]. The same is true of DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 2, and an
otherwise excellent group of articles in Symposium: Wrongful Convictions and Systemic Reform, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1117-301 (2005). There is, of course, considerable scholarly attention devoted to two specialized forms of
conversational testimony, that relating to confessions and that relating to the testimony of snitches. Even here,
however, there is virtually no attention paid to the reliability of witness's memory of such conversations. See
Steve Drizin and Richard Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 86 N.C. L. REV. 891
(2004); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645
(2004); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 563 (1999). In his seminal work
questioning the reliability of witness memory, Munsterberg focused almost exclusively on witness's memory for
events and occurrences, not questioning memories for conversations. HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS
STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME (1908).
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twenty years ago is commonplace, often constituting the core of the case, and the
system assumes that such testimony is either reasonably reliable or its unreliability
is adequately discounted by the trier of fact. The primary purpose of this article is
to cast doubt on that assumption: conversational witnesses are more common,
more likely to be inaccurate, more likely to be believed by jurors, and more likely
to produce irreversible errors than eyewitness testimony. Part II highlights the case
for further psychological and legal attention to the conversational witness by
demonstrating the frequency and finality of conversational testimony. Part III
undertakes a review of the existing psychological literature to explore the unique
aspects of conversations and the theoretical constructs underpinning the inaccu-
racy of conversational memory. Part IV undertakes a comparative analysis of
eyewitness versus conversational witness performance, with an emphasis on how
variables known to affect eyewitness memory may pose even greater challenges to
conversational memory. Part V explores the differences in the legal system's
response to the dangers inherent in eyewitness versus conversational witness
testimony. Finally, in Part VI, we explore a range of reforms that could substan-
tially reduce the risk of erroneous convictions attributable to conversational
witnesses.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
Eyewitness identification errors, although accounting for 4,000 or more false
convictions annually in the United States,21 are not risk factors in most criminal
prosecutions.22 Conversational testimony, in contrast, appears in most contested
criminal prosecutions. The criminal prosecution that does not rely at all upon
testimony about what the defendant said or what another person said to the
21. This approximation results from the following: In FBI analysis of DNA samples in thousands of cases in
which identity was contested and biological material from the perpetrator was available for comparison with the
accused, and where a definitive conclusion was reached, about 25% of those who had been identified as the
perpetrator were cleared. See supra note 3. This supports the inference that about 25% of defendants in disputed
eyewitness identifications are innocent. Assuming that half of those, had they gone to trial without DNA analysis,
would have been convicted (at least 3/4 of criminal trials result in convictions) then about 12% of all persons
identified in the criminal process as perpetrators but who dispute their guilt are nonetheless convicted. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JusTicE STATIsTics 418 tbl. 5.17 (Ann L. Pastore and Kathleen
Maguire eds., 2003), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/section5.pdf (indicating that in 2001 82% of federal
cases tried before a jury resulted in a conviction); Bureau of Justice Statistics, FELONY DEFENDANrs IN LARGE
URaAN CouNTiEs 32 (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/fdluc02.pdf ("An estimated 5% of the cases
went to trial .... An estimated 85% of all trials ended with a guilty verdict, and 15% with an acquittal."). There
were 924,000 felony convictions in 2000 in state courts. Bureau of Justice Statistics, SOURCEBOOK OF CRMIN AL
JusTicE STATisrlcs 401 tbl. 5.44 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2002). In 2001, approximately 75,000
defendants were prosecuted in federal courts, Id. at 402 tbl. 5.7. If, as suggested earlier, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text, about 3% of criminal prosecutions involve disputed eyewitness identifications, there are
about 33,000 state court convictions in such cases every year. If 12% of those convicted on eyewitness testimony
are innocent, then the number of innocents convicted per year is about 4,000. For other estimates and analyses of
error rates, see CuTLER & PENROD, supra note 2, at 8-10.
22. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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defendant is a rarity.
Statements attributed to the defendant are often the actus reus of the crime, as
when the charge is perjury, lying to an official, extortion, an illegal threat,
obstruction of justice, bribery, solicitation of unlawful sexual acts, or various kinds
of attempts. These statements are often made orally without documentary corrobo-
ration. Determining what was actually said by the defendant, as well as the crucial
conversational context, frequently rests on the memory and the credibility of a
single witness.
Even when the actus reus of the crime includes physical conduct, as it often does
even in nonviolent crimes, the prosecution's case commonly rests in part upon
testimony about what the defendant said or what was said to him. Conversational
testimony helps to reconstruct what the defendant did, the mental state accompany-
ing his conduct, or both. The conversations occur in a myriad of circumstances.
Conversational testimony is frequently introduced under the co-conspirator excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, which permits a witness to testify about conversations
between co-conspirators, even when the defendant was not present. 23 Conversa-
tional testimony also comes from cooperating accomplices reporting statements by
or to the defendant that evidence a guilty state of mind. In a substantial portion of
felony prosecutions, the prosecution obtains such testimony from family members
or snitches who quote the defendant as having made incriminating references to his
behavior.
The prosecution's case against a particular defendant sometimes rests on a
fragment of ambiguous conversation. In United States v. Alvarez,24 for example,
two men told DEA agents of a plan to deliver a load of kitchen appliances to
Colombia from a remote airstrip near Miami, Florida, smuggling marijuana on the
return flight. Alvarez arrived at the airstrip driving a pickup truck loaded with
kitchen appliances, which he then helped load onto the airplane. One of the agents,
acting undercover, asked Alvarez if he was going to be at the off-loading site on
return. Alvarez "smiled and nodded affirmatively., 25 The court held that this smile
and nod, in response to the agent's question (together with the hearsay about the
smuggling plan which was not otherwise connected to Alvarez) was sufficient to
convict him of conspiring to smuggle marijuana.26 In another drug case, the
evidence connecting Carmine Tramunti to a drug conspiracy was a conversation he
had about another's bail. One alleged co-conspirator told Tramunti, "We are
having a problem getting Moe Lentini out of prison." Tramunti replied, "Try to get
him out," but as for providing collateral for Lentini's bail, "There's nothing I can
do about that.",27 The Second Circuit held that this was sufficient to inculpate
23. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
24. 625 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
25. Id. at 1197.
26. Id. at 1198.
27. United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1111 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Tramunti in the conspiracy.28 In both Alvarez and Tramunti, convictions were
based on conversational testimony despite uncertainty about what was actually
said, as well as what was intended. In United States v. Quattrone,29 the key
statements made by Quattrone were not in dispute, since he made them in an email,
but what he intended by the email was reconstructed from many other communica-
tions. Quattrone was accused of obstructing federal investigations by sending an
email to his subordinates in an investment banking operation. The National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and a grand jury had been investigating several initial public offerings
and had issued subpoenas. 30 An associate circulated an email to various employ-
ees, explaining that under the company's document retention policy no notes,
drafts, internal memos or other similar documents were to be retained after the
transaction was completed. 31 The email added, "you should catch up on file
cleanup. 32 Quattrone then sent an email endorsing the cleanup memo, saying "I
strongly advise you to follow these procedures. 33 The Government claimed that
this was a corrupt suggestion that documents covered by the subpoenas be
destroyed, which Quattrone denied.34 In this case, conversations around the
subject of the email were important in determining what Quattrone intended by his
email.
On other occasions, a brief conversation with the defendant may be offered to
demonstrate guilty knowledge. In the 2005 trial of Bernard Ebbers, chief executive
of bankrupt WorldCom, Ebbers was accused of defrauding investors. Ebbers swore
he was unaware of the false accounting used by chief financial officer Scott
Sullivan to hide expenses and inflate revenues. 35 Sullivan, however, testified that
he told Ebbers that "the only way the company could meet its earnings projections
would be to make 'adjustments' to the financial statements. 36 Ebbers replied,
according to Sullivan, "We have to hit our numbers. 37 On the basis of such
conversational testimony, Ebbers was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in
prison.38
Conviction or acquittal may turn on the precise wording of out-of-court
28. Id.
29. 441 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2006).
30. Id. at 162-64.
31. Id. at 165-66.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 166.
34. The jury convicted Quattrone and the Second Circuit found the evidence sufficient but reversed for
inadequate instructions on criminal intent. Id. at 161.
35. Former WorldCom Chief Ebbers Denies Any Role in $11bn Fraud, IRISH INDEPENDENT, March 1, 2005,
available at http://www.unison.ie/irish-independent/stories.php3?ca= 186&si= 1350018&issueid= 12152.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Barry Wood, Enron Verdict Representative of Decade of US Corporate Corruption, VOICE OF AMERICA
NEws, May 26, 2006, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-05/2006-05-26-voa47.cfm.
[Vol. 44:1
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statements. In the 2001 price fixing trial of A. Alfred Taubman, former head of
Sotheby's, his chief accuser, Diana Brooks, testified that Taubman said to her,
implying that he wanted her to take the blame for the price-fixing, "You will look
good in [prison] stripes.",39 Taubman called to the stand another participant in the
conversation, however, who swore that Taubman said, self-mockingly, "Do you
think I'd look good in stripes?, 40 This conflicting testimony about Taubman's
exact words was a major controversy during Taubman's trial, presumably because
Taubman's version of this seemingly unimportant discrepancy, if believed, would
discredit the testimony of his accuser.41 Taubman, however, was convicted.42
The statements above went to prove criminal intent. In other cases, the criminal
conduct itself is proved by ambiguous statements. In a Texas court, Roy Criner was
convicted of rape (the victim was also murdered, but Criner was charged only with
the rape) based almost entirely on testimony by his co-workers that Criner claimed
he had picked up a hitchhiker and forced her to have oral sex, after which he
released her.43 DNA evidence later proved that Criner was not the rapist.44 In the
highly publicized 2002 trial of Michael Skakel for the 1975 murder of Martha
Moxley, Skakel was convicted almost entirely on ambiguous statements he was
said to have made on diverse occasions, some of them more than twenty years
before the trial. They included, "[I don't] know whether [I] did it," I "may have
done it,",4 5 "I did it" and "I am going to get away with murder. I am a Kennedy.",
46
Conversational testimony is also important when offered to prove that other
statements the defendant made were false. In Martha Stewart's prosecution for
lying to the SEC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the prosecution
claimed that she lied when she said she sold stock without any knowledge that the
CEO of the company was selling his stock.47 Among the witnesses testifying
against her was a woman who had been vacationing with her in Mexico when the
stock was sold. She testified that Martha told her that the CEO had sold his stock
and it is "nice to have brokers who tell you these things.' 48
39. Steve Dunleavy, Even on ParkAvenue, A Rat's Still a Rat, N.Y. POST, Nov. 27, 2001, at 9 (alteration in the
original).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 9; Alex Kuczynski, For the Elite, Easing the Way to Prison, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 9,2001, § 9, at 1.
42. Ex-Sothebys Boss Guilty in Scam, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 6,2001, at 7.
43. State v. Criner, 816 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
44. Although a DNA analysis of semen in the victim proved it was not Criner's, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals nonetheless refused to set aside Criner's conviction, saying it was still "possible" that he raped the
victim, e.g., if he wore a condom and the victim had recently had unprotected sex with someone else. DNA
analysis of a cigarette at the scene showed that the cigarette had been smoked by the rapist, making the
"co-ejaculator" theory untenable. Eventually, after Criner served ten years in prison, Governor Bush pardoned
him. DNA Frees Man, Condemns Another; Texas Prisoner Once Given Reprieve By Bush Gets New Date With
Executioner, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2000, atA2.
45. State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1002 (Conn. 2005).
46. David M. Herszenhorn, Witness Offers a Motive at Skakel Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2002, at B5.
47. United States v. Stewart, 433 E3d 273, 288 (2d Cir. 2006).
48. Id. at 283.
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In many felony cases, the prosecution also depends on testimony by police
officers about what the defendant said, either in the form of incriminating
admissions or confessions. 4 9 Even when those statements are reduced to writing
and signed by the defendant, their probative value rests substantially on testimony
about what the defendant orally said to the police prior to, during and after signing
the document. The cogency of such testimony depends not only upon the
credibility of the witnesses about what the defendant said but also on the entire
context of the interrogation: what was said and done to the defendant by the
interrogators.
Since investigations and trials are designed to reconstruct an approximation of
past events and the mental states that accompanied those events, it should not be
surprising that conversational testimony is present in virtually every trial, criminal
or civil. What is less clear is how consequential such testimony is in comparison to
that of eyewitness testimony. When the identity of the perpetrator of a crime is at
issue and an eyewitness mistakenly identifies the defendant, the false eyewitness
testimony is highly likely to have been a causal factor in any jury's decision to
convict the accused. The causal role of conversational witnesses is more specula-
tive, since the testimony will often bear not on the identity of the criminal but
rather on whether any crime was committed at all.50 The overall impact of false
conversational testimony is still very significant in the criminal process, however,
because such testimony is more common, conveys a significant emotional impact,
and its impact is more permanent.
Even if the typical conversational witness had less influence upon a jury than an
eyewitness, the far greater frequency of conversational witnesses is a counterbal-
ancing factor. To be an eyewitness, a person must have been at the scene of the
crime or its immediate aftermath. One who was not seen and identified by others at
or near the scene shortly after the crime is unlikely to make a credible eyewitness.
Although the testimony of a single eyewitness, like the testimony of a single
conversational witness, may suffice to convict without corroboration,5 1 there is
some inherent corroboration in the testimony of almost any eyewitness. The
eyewitness must be in a position, if challenged, to show by evidence other than his
own testimony that he was present at a time and place in which he could have
49. Confessions or incriminating statements are obtained by police interrogators in between 30% and 70% of
felony prosecutions. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 N.W. U. L. REv. 500, 509-10, 528 (1996). The rates vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Among the variables are the skill and methods of the interrogators, the perceived law enforcement need for
confessions (many defendants are caught in the act and no confession is needed), the sophistication of suspects
and, probably, the perceived attitudes of the local judiciary toward excluding confessions obtained by fraud or
coercion. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,652-53 (1996).
50. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. However, the conversations in the Criner and Skakel cases
were used to prove the identity of the perpetrator. This is not uncommon.
51. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (noting that conviction in federal court is
permitted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice). Some states, however, require corroboration of
accomplices. See, e.g., 1 CLIFORNIA JuRY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 3.11 (7th ed.) [hereinafter CAUIC].
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observed what he testified about. Consequently, the potential number of eyewit-
nesses in most prosecutions involving a questioned identity is extremely limited. A
conversational witness, however, need only have been in the same geographical
area as the defendant during any part of a substantial period of time--often
years-and to claim to have conversed with the defendant at some time during that
period, or at least to have overheard the defendant conversing with others.
Alternatively, the witness could swear to a telephone conversation with the
defendant. The number of potential conversational witnesses is, therefore, almost
infinite, and their claims to have had a conversation with the defendant or to have
overheard a statement by him are extremely difficult to contest.
Conversational witnesses can deliver emotionally powerful testimony that can
have persuasive effects far greater than more prosaic albeit more reliable evidence.
In the 1989 tax evasion prosecution of Leona Helmsley, for example, despite
documents proving that huge personal expenses had been erroneously deducted as
business expenses, the most damning evidence against Mrs. Helmsley may well
have been the brief testimony of her former maid who quoted her as having said,
"We don't pay taxes. Only the little people pay taxes." 52 In the recent trial of Enron
executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling for defrauding Enron's investors, the
extensive, tedious and complex evidence designed to show that the defendants
must have known that the company was on the verge of collapse was bolstered by
brief but powerful conversational testimony. Andrew Fastow, former chief finan-
cial officer, testified that he told Kenneth Lay that the company was in desperate
need of a "massive restructuring" without which it could not long survive.53
Another former executive, Kevin Hannon, testified to a meeting where some
dubious partnerships, designed to hide losses, were discussed. According to
Hannon, Jeffrey Skilling said, in apparent reference to the investment community,
"They're on to us." 54 In cases like Enron, a few words attributed to the defendant
may carry more weight with the jury than a mountain of financial evidence.
Unlike eyewitness testimony, conversational testimony is largely immune from
falsification and is therefore more final than is eyewitness testimony. When
evidence is developed that an eyewitness identification was erroneous, as when
DNA evidence points to a different perpetrator, or the true villain convincingly
confesses, the wrongful conviction will often be avoided or, if the evidence is
discovered after trial, will be vacated.55 Cogent evidence rarely exists to establish
the falseness of conversational testimony. If the witness had contact with the
defendant (or a plausible claim to the same) and no other witnesses were present,
the witness's word can rarely be disproven. The witness's motives for testifying
52. William Glaberson, Helmsley Gets 4-Year Term for Tax Fraud, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at BI.
53. Alexei Barrioneuvo, Fastow Leaves Stand Insisting Lay and Skilling Knew, N.Y. TIMEs, March 14, 2006, at
C4.
54. Witness Says Enron Chief Told Others, 'They're on to Us,"' N.Y. TIAEs, March 3, 2006, at C3.
55. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 523.
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can be explored, but this hardly demonstrates that the witness's recollection of the
conversation is erroneous. Sometimes the witness may have made inconsistent
statements about the conversation that he testified to having had or heard which
can be used to undermine his testimony, and sometimes the witness himself may
even recant. If the inconsistent statements or recantations are discovered after trial,
however, courts are extremely reluctant to vacate convictions based upon newly
discovered contradictions or recantations. 6 Their reluctance is based on two
assumptions: (1) contradictions and recantations are themselves conversational
accounts which have credibility problems: there is little reason to credit them over
the sworn testimony given at trial; and (2) even if false, the conversational
testimony may have been "harmless", i.e., it may not have caused the guilty
verdict.57 Since jury verdicts are immune from scrutiny into their bases, notions
about harmlessness are highly speculative, and courts, eager to uphold the
conviction, commonly place a nearly impossible burden on the defendant to prove
that the false evidence caused his conviction.58
Conversational testimony may be less dramatic than eyewitness identifications,
and there is no equivalent to DNA testing to spectacularly prove it wrong. The
aggregate and largely irreversible impact of erroneous conversational testimony is
no less significant, however, although in the shadowy world of memory, motives,
intent and implication, the scale of this impact can be difficult to quantify. In
contrast to the highly publicized cases of mistaken identity, the problem of
erroneous conversational testimony largely goes unnoticed.
Of course it is not just incriminating conversations which are problematic:
testimony about exculpatory conversations may be equally erroneous. Conversa-
tions with defendants or third parties might wrongly point to someone else as the
perpetrator, such as where a third person is said to have confessed to the crime of
which the defendant is accused. However, the risk of erroneous conversational
testimony convicting the innocent is much greater than the risk of it setting free the
guilty. As noted earlier, our rules of evidence clearly distinguish between out-of-
court statements that incriminate the accused and those that exculpate or exonerate
him. The latter statements are usually excluded as hearsay.59
The plethora of potential conversational witnesses makes them an especially
fecund source of witnesses to fill in gaps in the prosecution's case. Convictions
based upon conversational testimony are more likely to be final and unimpeach-
56. 26 JAMES WM. MOoRE r AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 633.05[5][b] (3d ed. 1997) (stating that
hearings based on recantations are disfavored by courts who view recantation motions with "extreme suspicion").
57. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972); MARVIN WAXNER & JAMES ZEn, 5 N.Y. CRIM. PRACTICE
34.3[3][a] (1991).
58. See, e.g., Criddle v. State, 1 S.W.3d 436, 440 (1999) (discussing the harmless error doctrine); 58 AM. JUR.
2d New Trial § 364 (2006) (discussing when recantation will allow the defendant to have a new trial); MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 56, at § 633.04 (discussing when perjured testimony will lead to a new trial).
59. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. The rationale for the distinction, such as it is, is discussed
infra, note 253.
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able than is eyewitness testimony. Careful analysis of the existing psychological
literature suggests, however, that not only is conversational testimony more
common and less reversible than eyewitness testimony, it is also less accurate. It is
the reliability of conversational memory to which we now turn.
Ill. CONVERSATIONAL MEMORY
In contrast to the large body of literature on the factors that influence eyewitness
testimony, there are few studies which systematically examine variables that may
affect the accuracy of conversational recall. Conversations are poorly understood,
and more ambiguous and complex than the relatively simple items subjects are
asked to remember-for example, an image, text, or story-in most research in the
psychological literature.
Some studies examining memory for oral information have focused on the
distortions that result during the process of relaying information from person to
person (i.e., the process of rumors).6 ° While such material has implications for the
accuracy of hearsay evidence,6 t memory for conversations in which one actively
participates is a distinct issue to which rumor research does not readily general-
ize.62 Other studies examining verbal memory have focused on words and
sentences, which, though relevant, are not fully adequate for understanding how
larger and much more complex conversations are remembered.6 3 Similarly,
memory for a transcript of a conversation may or may not be readily generalized to
memory for a live, interactive conversation.64
The dearth of studies examining "conversational memory" in the true sense of
the word, as opposed to memory for any oral material or conversation transcripts,
60. See, e.g., Gordon W. Allport & Leo Postman, An Analysis of Rumor, 10 PUB. OPINION Q. 501 (1946).
61. See, e.g., Maithilee K. Pathak & William C. Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury: Effects of
Suggestion on the Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 372 (1999). The
authors examined the transmission of information through a "hearsay chain" from the original event (a janitor
who was either cleaning or playing with toys) to a child's report about that event during an interview, and finally to
the adult's in-court report about the interview. Results showed that subjects had substantial difficulty determining
the true original event based on the adult's final report. Id. at 385-86.
62. See Laura Stafford et al., Actor-Observer Differences in Conversational Memory, 15 HuM. Comm. Ras.
590 (1989) [hereinafter Stafford et al., Actor-Observer Differences] (showing that the recall of conversations by
an active participant and by a mere observer are qualitatively different); see also Brian MacWhinney, Janice M.
Keenan, & Peter Reinke, The Role of Arousal in Memory for Conversation, 10 MEMORY & CoGNrrlON 308, 316
(1982) (showing that participants remember more than observers).
63. See, e.g., Laura Stafford et al., Conversational Memory: The Effects of Time, Recall, Mode, and Memory
Expectancies on Remembrances of Natural Conversations, 14 HuM. COMM. REs. 203, 204 (1987) [hereinafter
Stafford et al., Conversational Memory] (discussing the recognition that "'mechanisms of word and sentence
perception are not fully adequate for understanding how larger units such as conversations and stories are
processed' (citation omitted)).
64. See, e.g., Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Memory for Requests in Conversation, 20 J. VERaL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAv. 630, 639 (1981) (finding that subjects recognized target sentences between when they heard them
in an actual conversation and when they read them in stories). But see Elizabeth Bates et al., The Role of
Pronominalization and Ellipsis in Texts: Some Memory Experiments, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 676, 681
(1980) (finding no such difference).
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has probably contributed to the continuing complacent acceptance of the general
accuracy of conversational testimony. Nevertheless, even the limited studies
available are sufficient to support the following generalizations about conversa-
tional memory, each of which will be examined below: (A) conversational
memory is astoundingly poor; (B) people remember gist information better than
surface information; (C) conversational memory is strongly influenced by motiva-
tional biases; (D) conversational memory is subject to schema-driven or contextual
errors; (E) conversational memory is extremely malleable; (F) neither witness
consistency nor witness confidence implies accuracy of conversational memory;
and (H) the conversation as the object to be remembered is unique in that it is
cross-modal. Before addressing these propositions individually, it is necessary to
understand the dominant psychological model for conversational memory, fuzzy
trace theory.
Fuzzy trace theory proposed a psychological model-subsequently well vali-
dated--consisting of two parallel memories for conversations. The first, surface
memory, functions like a videotape, including the actual words, phrases, intonation
and gestures used in the conversation. The second, gist memory, is a construct
created by the listener from the underlying meaning of what is communicated, as
the listener understands it.65 Thus, a given speech act, such as a request to have the
door closed (gist), may be expressed in multiple forms (surface). The surface form,
in turn, can vary in syntax [imperative ("close the door!"), interrogative ("could
you close the door?"), or declarative ("it would be nice if you closed the door")]; in
degree of directness [direct ("could you close the door"?) or indirect ("it's getting
chilly in here")]; and in prepositional content ["I need the door closed" versus "I
would like the door to be closed"].
The two memories differ in terms of their duration (rate of decay) and accuracy
(the ability to resist false identifications and retroactive interference 66). Surface
memory decays rapidly and resists false identifications, but is subject to retroactive
interference. Gist memory is longer-lasting and subject to misidentification, but
resists retroactive interference.67 Further research has even allocated gist and
surface memory to different anatomical regions of the brain, namely the frontal
lobe and medial temporal lobe, respectively.68 Fuzzy trace theory suggests results,
largely borne out by empirical research, which contradict closely held assumptions
about memory, namely, that (a) truth is more memorable than fiction, (b) reports of
true events are more consistent than reports of false events, and (c) neutral,
65. See David R. Gerkens & Steven M. Smith, Effects of Perceptual Modality on Verbatim and Gist Memory,
11 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 143, 143 (2004).
66. Retroactive interference refers to the ability of subsequent events to alter prior memories.
67. Gerkens & Smith, supra note 65, at 143.
68. Brenda Melo, Gordon Winocur & Morris Moscovitch, False Recall and False Recognition: An Examina-
tion of the Effects of Selective and Combined Lesions to the Medial Temporal Lobe/Diencephalon and Frontal
Lobe Structures, 16 CoGNTIvE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 343, 357 (1999).
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non-suggestive questioning does not falsify memory.69
The idea that samples of a true conversational memory are more easily
recognized than an entirely fictional conversation, in particular, is so deeply held
that it is both difficult and troubling to imagine that it could be wrong. However,
gist memory is so independent from surface memory that one can recognize actual
events ("hits"), but one can equally "recognize" non-events ("false alarms") with
similar meanings. Numerous studies have found false alarm rates equaling or
exceeding hit rates under recall circumstances that are more conducive to accurate
recollection than the circumstances surrounding most courtroom testimony.70 In
one study, using tests that were administered only a few seconds after presentation
of the text to be remembered, the recognition rate for the same text (80%) did not
differ significantly from the false alarm rate for distractor texts (i.e., new texts with
completely different wording but some related meaning) (78%). 7 1 After a two-day
delay, however, recognition of the actual text averaged 17%, but incorrect
recognition (false alarm) of the distractor texts averaged 24%.72 Events that were
not experienced at all became more familiar than true events actually experi-
enced.7 3
A. Conversational Memory is Astoundingly Poor
Studies have unanimously demonstrated that surface memory, in particular, is
amazingly short-lived. In fact, surface memory begins fading within 80 syllables
of hearing.74 In one study, even when conversing with their own children, and even
when told that they would need to remember their conversations, after two days
mothers only remembered 5% of actual utterances.7 5 Another study of short
conversations between adults found that witnesses recalled only 10% of surface
conversational content (i.e., actual sentences uttered) immediately after, and only
4% one month later.76 When a group of trained interviewers were asked to
remember their questions, when tested immediately after the interview not only
did they fail to recall over 80% of their own questions, they even remembered the
wrong type of questions: most interviewers believed they had asked primarily
open-ended questions, when in reality over 80% were close-ended, and 13% were
69. Charles J. Brainerd, Valerie F. Reyna & Debra A. Poole, Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory: Memory
Theory in the Courtroom, in FALSE-MEMORY CREATION IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
IMPLICATIONS 93, 103 (David F Bjorklund, ed. 2000).
70. This is true even with explicit instructions to the subject before the event to focus carefully and try to
remember, and without a long delay between the event and recall. Id. at 107.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 108.
73. Id.
74. Gregory L. Murphy & Amy M. Shapiro, Forgetting of Verbatim Information in Discourse, 22 MEMORY &
COGNITION 85, 85 (1993).
75. Bruck, Ceci & Francoeur, supra note 18, at 98.
76. Stafford et al., Conversational Memory, supra note 63, at 203.
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leading.77
What these studies reveal is a dual failure: a virtually complete disappearance of
surface memory, and the inability to accurately separate gist memories from
similar-sounding fiction. The disassociation of gist from surface memory has
important consequences, as formulating and decoding the surface form of an
utterance is a crucial component of understanding and remembering speech.78
Despite the astoundingly poor quality of conversational memory, we rely on it to a
great extent, as illustrated by the cases described in Part II.
B. Gist Information is Remembered Better than Surface Information
Studies have shown that memory for the exact wording of a sentence is
extremely poor, while memory for gist information is slightly better. For example,
Sachs tested subjects' memory for passages of conversational text that they had
read or heard, and found that although gist memory was somewhat better than
chance level, subjects were able to remember almost none of the surface or
structural information of the original sentences. 79 At the lowest extreme, Kintsch
& Bates found that subjects could recall only three to four sentences verbatim from
a lecture they had heard a few days earlier.8°
Researchers attribute the poorer memory for surface structure, relative to gist
information, to the fact that in the context of everyday life, verbatim information is
not as important as its meaning. 8 You do not need to remember whether the
requester said "would you close the door" or "could you close the door" in order
for you to fulfill that request. Consequently, people do not attend to or encode the
surface manifestation of a speech act, and therefore are unable to recall it later.
Our trial system demands a high degree of verbatim accuracy from conversa-
tional witnesses, yet it appears that people are rarely capable of producing such
accounts from memory. As the studies described above demonstrate, even gist
memory of conversations is poor. Together with the fact that trials take place
months or even years after a conversation is over, such studies cast serious doubts
on the reliability of most conversational testimony.
C. Conversational Memory is Vulnerable to Motivational Biases
Most studies of conversational memory require subjects to recognize statements
77. Amye R. Warren et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of a Training Program in Interviewing Child Witnesses,
3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL Sci. 128, 132-33 (1999).
78. This is true especially where gist and surface memory are unavoidably linked, such as with the punch-line
of a joke, a compliment or an insult. Murphy & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 87; Susan Kemper, Memory for the
Form and Force of Declaratives and Interrogatives, 8 MEMORY & COGNmON 367, 367 (1980).
79. Jaqueline S. Sachs, Memory in Reading and Listening to Discourse, 2 MEMORY & COGNOrrON 95, 97-98
(1974).
80. Walter Kintsch & Elizabeth Bates, Recognition Memory for Statements from a Classroom Lecture, 3 HuM.
LEARNING & MEMORY 150, 150 (1977).
81. Murphy & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 85.
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which were said or heard in the conversation, and to distinguish them from false
statements invented by the investigators. The task a conversational witness is
required to perform is entirely different and more difficult: recalling or recreating
88
the conversation. 82 It is well known that our memory capacity for recognition far
exceeds our capacity to recall.83 Since surface memory is so poor, testifying to
what was said in a conversation is fundamentally a process of invention, whereby
the witness essentially invents what might have been said, based on the witness's
memory and interpretation of the gist of the conversation, and how the witness
believes the parties might have communicated that gist in words.84 Therefore, not
only is a large part of the conversational memory simply lost (as described above),
a large part of the conversational testimony is invented. An important means of
"inventing" conversations is for the witness to recreate them in a manner
consistent with his or her motivational biases or ego.
This aspect of conversational memory is well illustrated by Neisser's 85 study of
John Dean's testimony to the Senate during the Watergate investigation. In a rare
research opportunity for psychologists, the accuracy of Dean's memory for key
conversations was independently verifiable because Nixon had secretly recorded
the conversations.86 The central "issue of the entire Watergate Hearing was the
extent and timing of Nixon's knowledge of the Watergate cover-up---what he knew
and when he knew it."'87 "John Dean, as Counsel to the President and a central
figure in managing the Watergate cover-up, was privy to much confidential White
House material and was the first high-ranking official to go public against the
82. See also infra Section 1.C.
83. See, e.g., C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification and the Selection of Distractors
for Lineups, 15 LAW & HUM. BEAV. 43, 46 (1991); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual
Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 207, 210 (2006); A. Venter & D.A. Louw, The Effect of
Confidence and Method of Questioning on Eyewitness Testimony, 24 MED. & L. 369, 373 (2005).
84. Brainerd, Reyna & Poole, supra note 69, at 93.
85. Ulric Neisser, John Dean's Memory, in MEMORY OBSERVED: REMEMBERING IN NATURAL CONTEXTS 263
(Ulric Neisser & Ira E. Hyman, Jr., eds., 2d ed., 2000).
86. Neisser's study is not without critics. See Derek Edwards & Jonathan Potter, The Chancellor's Memory:
Rhetoric and Truth in Discursive Remembering, 6 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 187 (1992) (arguing that the very
attempt to compare Dean's memory to an objective true conversation is fundamentally flawed for assuming
"simplistic notions of true original events"). In Edwards and Potter's view, there can never really be true verbatim
recall of conversations because "the level and content of encoding of speech depends crucially upon, and develops
alongside, the analytical insights that are revealed by it." Id. at 191. Similarly, because the meaning (gist) of
conversational utterances is always derived from context and can always be disputed, it "makes no sense to talk
about accurate gist [memory] in any decontextualized way, abstracted from conversational pragmatics." Id. at
192. While intriguing, the philosophical debate over the existence of an independently verifiable truth is beyond
the scope of this article.
It should be noted, however, that Edwards and Potter's position is still consistent with the main point of Section
I]I.G.-that the cross-modal nature of conversations makes conversational memory unique and more difficult to
accurately recall. See also infra Section IV.A.5. If anything, Edwards & Potter seem to go further, as they would
presumably endorse the position that the cross-modality makes conversations not merely more difficult, but rather
wholly impossible to remember, at least in the transcript-like verbatim-sense.
87. Harvey L. Molotch & Deirdre Boden, Talking Social Structure: Discourse, Domination and the Watergate
Hearings, 50 AM. Soc. REv. 273, 279 (1985).
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Nixon White House. 88
Dean's testimony, utterly lacking in surface accuracy, was not much better at the
gist level.8 9 Rather, Dean only "remembered how he had felt himself and what he
had wanted, together with the general state of affairs; he didn't remember what
anyone had actually said." 90 In short, his testimony was about his fantasized
version of September 15, 1972, the way "it should have been."91 Among errors that
Dean made were common cross-modal re-encodings (e.g., remembering Nixon to
have actually said "have a seat" when what Nixon must have actually done was
gesture to sit down);92 inaccurate recall of the details of time and place of a
conversation (e.g., remembering particularly memorable phrases like the "million-
dollar statement" to have occurred in the wrong conversation); 93 and sometimes
even outright imagining of things that he thought should have occurred (e.g.,
Nixon congratulating him).94
Although Dean did accurately remember certain "common themes that re-
mained invariant across many conversations, 95 he incorporated the themes into
the wrong conversations.9 6 Whether such accuracy is sufficient for trial purposes,
however, is a wholly different matter. As noted previously, courts rarely will
permit testimony about the "themes" of a conversation or the witness's "impres-
sions" unaccompanied by specific words or gestures.
In accounting for the inaccuracies in Dean's memory, Neisser attributed much to
Dean's personal goals and desires-he remembered his fantasized version of
88. Id. at 276.
89. Neisser, supra note 85, at 272, 276.
90. Id. at 277.
91. Id. at 273.
92. Id. See infra Section 11.G for a discussion of cross-modal memory. Alternatively, Nixon may not have
gestured at all, and Dean's memory could have simply been based on an "entering-the-room script." Id. This
would be an example of a schema-driven filling of memory gaps. See infra Section I.D.
93. Id. at 282. With regard to memory of the time dimension of conversations, see A. Daniel Yarmey, Accuracy
and Confidence of Duration Estimates Following Questions Containing Marked and Unmarked Modifiers, 20
J. APPtEu Soc. PSYCHOL. 1139 (1990). In Yarmey's study, subjects who had engaged in a two-person discussion
for either twenty or forty minutes were asked to estimate the duration of the conversation, either immediately after
the conversation or one week later. Id. at 1139. Results indicated that the accuracy of time estimations was
unrelated to the length of the actual discussion nor to the time of the test. Id. at 1145. Lastly, there was no
relationship between the accuracy of estimation and the subject's confidence in the certainty of the estimation. Id.
at 1147.
94. Neisser, supra note 85, at 273. According to Neisser, in Dean's mind, "Nixon should have been
glad... [and] praising him should have been the first order of business." Id.
95. Id. at 284. Neisser calls such memory "repisodic." Id. at 284. Even though Dean believed that he was
recalling one conversation at a time (episodic), he was actually remembering a single recollection that typified or
represented a set of repeated and related experiences (repisodic). Id. Memory errors that result from the blending
of information from several instances into one more general representation are also called "conjunction errors."
Ira E. Hyman, Jr., Creating False Autobiographical Memories: Why People Believe Their Memory Errors, in
ECoLoGIcAL APPROACHES TO COorlON: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ULRic NEISSER 229, 232 (Eugene Winograd et al.
eds., 1999).
96. Neisser, supra note 85, at 284.
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September 15, 1972, the way "it should have been. 97 Dean could not help but
emphasize his role in every event.98 In addition to causing such self-serving
distortions, personal goals and desires also influence whether one's own or the
other's statements will be better recalled.99
D. Conversational Memory is Subject to Schema-Driven Errors
Another consistent source of error in witness recreation of conversations
through testimony is a presumed conformity with schema or context. The impor-
tance of context in conversational memory is demonstrated by studies focusing on
the errors that subjects make on memory tests. Studies have shown that people
exhibit systematic biases in memory for the wording of remarks. In Brewer & Hay,
subjects read a text written in one of five different styles (e.g., academic, business,
etc.) and were later tested on their recall of the material.100 Results showed that
although subjects were very poor at recalling the material verbatim, they produced
items that were consistent with the style of the presented text.101 In other words,
memory for the actual wording of individual sentences was outweighed by the
contextual features, in this case, the overall style of the text.
Holtgraves, et al., found similar schema-driven errors in actual conversations.
10 2
In conversation there is an implicit expectation that only high status speakers are
permitted to use assertive forms of speech. 10 3 Thus, consistent with Kemper's
research on the importance of context in interpreting ambiguous speech acts,
1°4
Holtgraves et al. hypothesized that this expectation would lead subjects to encode
remarks by a high status speaker as having been more assertive than the same
remarks by a lower status speaker.10 5 Because information about the speaker's
high status would "serve as a context that disambiguates the speaker's intent,"
subjects would adopt a "direct and assertive interpretation of the remark."
' 10 6
Results confirmed the hypothesis: what may be interpreted as a suggestion if
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id. at 283.
99. Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSCYHOL. 322, 329 (1979) (showing that, for intercollegiate basketball players, actions of their own team were
recalled more accurately than actions of the other team).
100. William F. Brewer & Anne E. Hay, Reconstructive Recall of Linguistic Style, 23 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAV. 237 (1984).
101. Id. at 244-45.
102. Thomas Holtgraves, Thomas K. Skrull & Daniel Socall, Conversation Memory: The Effects of Speaker
Status on Memory for the Assertiveness of Conversation Remarks, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 149
(1989).
103. Susan Kemper & David Thissen, Memory for Dimensions of Requests, 20 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 552, 552 (1981); Kemper, supra note 78, at 367 (explaining that people examine the "situational context"
when recalling conversations).
104. Kemper, supra note 78, at 367-68.
105. Holtgraves, Skrull & Socall, supra note 102, at 151.
106. Id.
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uttered by a lower status speaker tended to be heard (i.e., encoded) as a command
if uttered by a higher status speaker.I° 7
The schema-driven nature of conversational memory is also apparent at the
retrieval stage. Kitayama & Burnstein approached college students on campus and
asked them to perform a small favor using two alternate surface forms of a request:
giving a piece of paper versus giving a sheet of paper.10 8 The authors noted that
while both words were perfectly grammatical and natural, the word "piece" is
more common than the word "sheet."' 0 9 When the students' memory for the
particular request was probed, it was found that the actual but low-frequency word
("sheet") was often replaced by the more common but incorrect word ("piece")."t0
These results simultaneously showed that memory for the surface structure of an
utterance is poor and that when memory fails, people use default information
found in their social, situational, or in this case, vocabulary schemas to fill in the
gaps.111
E. Conversational Memory is Extremely Malleable
It is worth emphasizing again that even without any unusual circumstances, it is
quite common for false recognition or recall of conversations to exceed true
memory.'1 2 This is because surface memory deteriorates so rapidly that subjects
are able to convince themselves that they actually remember fictional statements
which are consistent with the gist of the conversation (as they interpreted it);
further, subjects will more readily accept a false statement which supports their
ego, schema or expectations than a true statement which does not. 113 Of course, the
gist memory itself is subject to misinterpretation, forgetting and distortion when
unmoored from the surface memory of what was actually said. 114 Moreover, the
conversational memory which does exist can be further degraded through sugges-
tions of false memories, schema or expectations, with the false memory being
unintentionally strengthened and consolidated through sincere recognition and
repetition by the witness.'
15
The malleability of conversational memory and the process by which it is
107. Id. at 158.
108. Shinobu Kitayama & Eugene Burnstein, Automaticity in Conversations: A Reexamination of the
Mindlessness Hypothesis, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 220 (1988).
109. Id. at 220.
110. Id. at 222.
111. Id.
112. See supra Section UI.B, especially Brainerd, Reyna & Poole, supra note 69.
113. See supra notes 71-78.
114. See generally Robert J. Jarvella, Immediate Memory and Discourse Processing, in 13 THE PSYCHOL. OF
LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 379 (1979); Murphy & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 85 (claiming that "surface forms
can be a crucial step in formulating and understanding utterances" (citation omitted)).
115. See Aaron S. Benjamin, On the Dual Effects of Repetition on False Recognition, 27 J. OF ExPERImsrrAL
PsYcH.: LEARNING, MEMORY AND CoGNITIoN 941(2001) (concluding from experiments that repetition strengthens
both true recognition and false recognition).
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transformed will be addressed further in Section IV.B.2 below. However, it should
be noted that courtroom testimony contains all the features required to facilitate
false memories in a conversational witness: (i) there are long intervals between the
actual events and memory reports; (ii) witness's accounts are rarely subjected to
verbatim recording prior to trial; (iii) the influences and suggestions brought to
bear on the witness by interested parties or their attorneys or agents are also rarely
recorded and are virtually unregulated; (iv) crimes constitute strong uniting themes
(schema) which can have a stronger influence upon the witness's interpretation and
recall than the actual memories; (v) law enforcement agents often urge the witness
to assent to things which they cannot clearly remember but which appear to be
consistent with the gist of events, including the accounts of others; (vi) the types of
questions posed to the witness are often suggestive, reinforcing the crime-story
schema: did the robber carry a pistol? Did the robber demand money?; (vii) these
modified memories are repeatedly cued and reinforced during interviews and
testimony, making them more firmly entrenched than the original source memory;
and (viii) the format of courtroom testimony invites the witness to recreate
individual verbatim conversations, with particular emphasis on the actual wording
when the defendant's intent or knowledge is at issue.'
16
F Neither Witness Consistency nor Witness Confidence Implies Accuracy
Witness consistency is a commonly cited criterion by judges and attorneys for
assessing testimonial credibility. n 7 Not only is conventional testimony itself
deemed unproblematic, but absent unusual or suspicious circumstances, witnesses
are generally believed to be both honest and accurate." 8 However, many studies
have found that false memories can be more consistent than true memories.
Because surface memory fades faster than gist memory, false memories are more
effectively reinforced by repetition than true memories. A witness is apt to adopt,
reinforce and consistently repeat a false memory, becoming more confident in this
falsehood with each retelling." 9
One of the main reasons that erroneous testimony is so problematic is that jurors
place an overwhelmingly heavy emphasis on the capacity of the witness to gauge
116. Brainerd, Reyna & Poole, supra note 69, at 108.
117. Juries are routinely instructed to take into account a witness's consistency in assessing the witness's
credibility. See Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions, CRMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2d ed. (N.Y.), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/cjill-GenerallCJi12d.Credibility.pdf; MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUcnONS-CRamINAL
7.01 (2004) [hereinafter FEDERAL JuRY INSTRUcrIONS].
118. See generally Steven Lubet, Lawyer's Poker, 57 U. MLAMI L. REv. 283, 306 ("Even the most cynical
lawyer, however, would have to agree that most witnesses tell the truth most of the time."); Joseph W. Rand, The
Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 39 (2000) (arguing that unless a person is
generally skeptical beforehand, people usually believe another is honest).
119. Brainerd, Reyna & Poole, supra note 69, at 109.
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his own reliability, in the form of expressing a level of confidence, 120 when in fact
research has shown that the correlation between a witness's confidence and
accuracy ("CA correlation") is very weak. 121 The tendency to be overly confident
of one's general knowledge is one of the "most striking and stable effects that have
emerged from confidence studies."' 122 The single most important factor affecting
jurors' beliefs about the credibility of a witness is the confidence in which he
expresses his testimony.1 23 In the context of eyewitnesses, it has been repeatedly
demonstrated that there is very little correlation between witness confidence and
witness accuracy. A witness who says "I am absolutely certain-there is no doubt
in my mind" is almost as likely to be in error as a witness who says "I'm not really
sure, but .... ,,124 Despite the lack of similar studies concerning conversational
testimony, considerable anecdotal and research evidence points toward a low
120. R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Carolyn M. Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness Identification
Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 79 (1981) ("It is not the rate of false
identifications per se that creates problems for the criminal justice system. Instead, it is the rate at which jurors
believe false-identification witnesses versus accurate-identification witnesses."); see Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et
al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995) (concluding after a review of literature examining
juror attitudes that "it is quite clear that jurors rely heavily on witness expressions of confidence as a guide to
witness accuracy, and tend to neglect other aspects of trial evidence, including variables that are known to
influence eyewitness performance" (citation omitted)); Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson,
Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440 (1979)
[hereinafter Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions] (reporting that juror perceptions
of witness confidence accounts for fully 50% of the variance in juror judgments as to witness accuracy); see also
John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 19, 27 (1983) (reporting that 56% of the potential jurors surveyed believed
that there was a positive certainty and accuracy relationship in eyewitness identifications).
121. Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson, The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its
Implications for Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981) [hereinafter Wells et al., Tractability of
Eyewitness Confidence] ("Eyewitness confidence has been shown to be poorly related to eyewitness identification
accuracy at best, unrelated much of the time, and sometimes negatively related." (citations omitted)); see Steven
Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 817, 822-825 (1995) (reviewing existing studies on eyewitness certainty and accuracy
correlations, which have reported overall correlations ranging from 0.00 to 0.29).
In fact, a survey of eyewitness experts revealed that 87.1% of those surveyed believed that the lack of a
certainty and accuracy relationship was reliable enough to be offered in court; at the same time, the same survey
revealed that experts believed such non-correlative relationship to be one of the most counterintuitive findings
(only 3.2% of the experts believed that the non-correlative relationship was within the jurors' common sense).
Saul M. Kassin, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Vicki L. Smith, The "GeneralAcceptance" of Psychological Research on
Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089, 1094.
122. Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage & Heinz Klienbolting, Probabilistic Mental Models: A Brunswikian
Theory of Confidence, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 506, 506 (1991). This overconfidence effect is quite robust and stable, as
it appears resistant to various elimination attempts, including the giving of rewards and clarification of
instructions. Id. (discussing the findings of Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIAsEs 422 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982)).
123. See Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, I PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 909, 925-926 (1995) [hereinafter Leippe, Expert Testimony]; Chet K. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored
Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41 WILAMETTE L. REV. 373, 381-82 (2005).
124. See Pager, supra note 123, at 381.
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conversational CA correlation. 125 For example, in the Nixon case, Dean was quite
confident in the accuracy of his conversational memory, a confidence which the
Nixon tapes showed to be misplaced. Similarly, the mothers in the study by Bruck,
who had been asked to recall a conversation with their children, were extremely
disappointed in their poor performance, 126 which leads to the inference that they
had been overly confident of their conversational memory.
Additional support for the low CA correlation is also found in Leippe: "while
people may have a veridical feeling about how accessible or 'strong' their memory
representations of objects are, they are not likely to be conscious of the transforma-
tions that these memories may have" undergone.1 27 Therefore, "if people are
unaware of whether and to what extent there have been internally produced
alterations of their memory, they should be poor judges of the accuracy of their
recollections if indeed such alterations occurred." 128 Although Leippe was attempt-
ing to explain the lack of CA correlation in the context of eyewitness memory,129
the idea is equally applicable to conversational memory, for the latter is even more
susceptible to transformations during the retention stage (e.g., through the misin-
formation 130 and repetition effects). 131 Even more, unlike eyewitness memory,
which arguably undergoes transformations only after the memory has been stored,
conversational memory is additionally prone to transformations during the encod-
ing stage as well-a direct result of the cross-modal nature of conversations, where
non-verbal perceptions (e.g., seeing a person motioning to enter) may be trans-
formed into memory for an utterance (e.g., recalling the person as having actually
said, "come in"). 132 Thus, to the extent that the weak eyewitness CA correlation is
a result of the lack of awareness that a memory trace has undergone a transforma-
tion, the conversational CA correlation, with even more opportunities for alter-
ations, would likely be even weaker.
What this suggests is that even if the initial conversational CA correlation was
high, the correlation could subsequently be eroded by manipulating (i.e., increas-
ing) the witness's confidence level, without correspondingly increasing his accu-
racy. In this connection, Leippe noted several factors that could affect a witness's
125. See Leippe, Expert Testimony, supra note 123, at 909 (discussing the conclusions of much research that
"eyewitness identifications and recollections are susceptible to error;" "a disturbingly high error rate").
126. Bruck, Ceci & Francoeur, supra note 18, at 104 n.6. See also supra note 77 and accompanying text, for a
description of the study.
127. Michael R. Leippe, Effects of Integrative Memorial and Cognitive Processes on the Correspondence of




130. See infra Section IV.B.2.
131. See infra Section IV.B.3.
132. See infra Section 11.G.
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confidence independent of his memory. 133 For example, repeated interrogations
increase a witness's public commitment to a particular memory, and can therefore
increase his confidence in his statements. 134 Answering repeated questions also
forces a witness to continually think about his memories, which studies have
shown to similarly increase one's confidence in the accuracy of his memories
(without improving actual accuracy). 135 Similarly, Wells and colleagues 136 showed
that a simple instruction for the witness to mentally rehearse his account and to
anticipate possible questions that a cross-examiner might ask was sufficient to
markedly elevate the witness's confidence in his memory. Since nothing had
happened to correspondingly increase the accuracy of the witness's memory, the
result was an increase in overconfidence. Luus & Wells showed that witness
confidence also increased as a result of hearing that other witnesses have identified
the same suspect.
1 37
All of the these phenomena commonly occur in the preparation of witnesses for
trial. A conversational witness who testifies for the prosecution is reinforced and
strengthened in his confidence levels by a multitude of influences leading up to his
testimony at trial. The consequences of the malleability of conversational memory
and the inappropriate confidence placed therein is clear. Consistent with research
showing that a witness's self-expressed confidence is the primary determinant of
lay perceptions of a witness's credibility, 138 Wells and colleagues' mock-jurors
were significantly more likely to convict after having heard the rehearsed (i.e.,
more confident) witness. 139 Thus, conversational witness's confidence is doubly
misleading: not only does the initial witness confidence bear little relationship to
accuracy, but subsequent time and events serve to increase confidence while
further decreasing accuracy.
G. Cross-modal Complications
One's natural focus in a conversation is on the pragmatic message conveyed by
the conversation-as opposed to the particular words that are actually uttered.
Conversations, and memories thereof, never consist of words alone. Conversa-
tional memory is a very functional, affect-driven activity which does not clearly
133. Leippe, Effects of Cognitive Processes, supra note 127, at 268-70. In addition to repeated interrogations,
other factors Leippe notes are: (1) the use of a non-forced-choice recognition test; (2) the use of biased line-up
instructions; and (3) the implicit belief that facial memory is good. Id. Only repeated interrogations are discussed
in detail, however, as it is the most relevant to the conversational context.
134. Id. at 269-70.
135. Id. at 270 (citing Abraham Tesser, Self-Generated Attitude Change, in 11 ADvANcEs IN ExPERB4ENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. (Leonard Berokowitz ed., 1978)).
136. Wells et al., Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence, supra note 121, at 694.
137. C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and
Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 720 (1994).
138. Id. at 714 (listing numerous studies demonstrating this conclusion).
139. Wells et al., Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence, supra note 121, at 694.
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distinguish between the process of perception, imagination, affect, understanding
and motivation. 140 The term "cross-modal" refers to the situation "where what is to
be remembered was experienced in a different form than the form in which it is
recalled." 141 For example, a visual experience, such as a person motioning to enter
or pointing to a chair, may be re-encoded as a conversational statement-the
person remembers having heard the "speaker" actually say "come on in" or "have
a seat." While this particular example may not be so problematic for the purposes
of "truthfully" testifying about a conversation, other instances of cross-modal
memory are more troublesome. A nod may be remembered by the listener as a
vocalized "yes", when in fact the nodder could have simply meant the gesture as an
acknowledgement of something the listener previously suggested, or an acknowl-
edgment of having heard or understood what the speaker said rather than as an
expression of agreement. Worse, a listener may have simply imagined having
heard the speaker say "I agree" because such a statement conforms to the speaker's
conversational schema. 142 Similarly, a sigh may be interpreted by the listener as an
indication of satisfied relief (e.g., that a cover-up conspiracy is progressing
smoothly) and subsequently encoded as a vocalized expression thereof, when in
fact the sigher may have been expressing his reservations about the morality of the
situation. These are all points that may later prove significant to the issue of
culpability, but to which even the best-intentioned conversational witness may not
be capable of correctly testifying.
The cross-modal nature of conversations and its encoding into gist memory
necessarily involves a process of interpretation by the encoder-both at the
cultural and personal level. The process is cultural because the interpretation is
shaped by cultural norms and expectations, and by the communicative context of
the particular occasion. 143 The process is also personal because the experience that
is encoded as conversational statements is filtered through the individual encoder's
imagination, affect, schematic knowledge and motivation. The implication for the
conversational witness is that what he in good faith recalls as having been said may
never actually have been uttered. Instead, the memory may be based on something
visually experienced, or it may be a product of the listener's culturally and
personally contaminated interpretation. Still worse, it may solely be a figment of
his imagination.
The empirical findings presented above in this Part III create a compelling case
to be concerned with the accuracy of conversational testimony. From Part II, we
140. Derek Edwards & David Middleton, Conversation and Remembering: Bartlett Revisited, 1 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 77, 78 (1987) (discussing the contribution of F.C. BARErr, REMEMBERING: A STuDY IN
EXPERMENTAL AND SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1932), to a more unitary study of human memory).
141. Id. at79.
142. Molotch & Boden, supra note 87, at 280 ("It is generally the case that people know when they are being
understood without another's marking comprehension with an explicit 'I understand.' Rather,... an actual lack of
request for detail [may] indicate a state of communicative understanding." (citation omitted)).
143. Edwards & Middleton, supra note 140, at 83; see generally supra Section n.C.
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know that many more cases turn upon conversational testimony than upon
eyewitness testimony, which is relatively unusual. Despite this fact, relatively little
psychological research and virtually no legal articles have drawn attention to the
problem of conversational witnesses, while the study of eyewitness testimony is a
major component of teaching and research in the fields of law and psychology. In
Part IV we compare aspects of eyewitnesses with conversational witnesses,
leading to the suggestion that conversational witnesses are not only far more
common (Part II), they are also likely to be less accurate.
IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS VERSUS CONVERSATIONAL TESTIMONY
Psychologists have extensively observed the many shortcomings of eyewitness
testimony. These shortcomings have been established repeatedly in experiments
and documented in hundreds of exonerations.1'44 As a result, our early acceptance
of their accuracy has been substantially revised. At the same time, however, our
faith in the reliability of conversational witnesses has remained largely unaffected.
Because there are few studies looking at conversational testimony per se,145 to
assess its accuracy, a comparative analysis of the targets to be remembered must be
conducted-a conversation for conversational witnesses versus a visual experi-
ence for eyewitnesses. This exercise points to the conclusion that conversational
witnesses may be even more susceptible to error than the eyewitness at each and
every stage of the memory process: acquisition, retention, and retrieval.
A. Acquisition: Encoding the Original Event
In order for something to be remembered, the target, whether a visual scene, a
particular experience, or a conversation, must first be perceived and encoded into
memory. Eyewitness research has identified numerous factors that may lead
witnesses to encode differing observations of the same event. These factors can be
classified into variables that affect the witness's (1) perception, (2) attention, (3)
focus and (4) understanding.
146
1. Perception
Factors under this category refer to a witness's observational point of view. They
include, among others, the lighting of a particular scene, the duration of the event,
and the witness's distance from the event. These factors determine whether the
witness had a sufficient opportunity to view the event from a vantage point
144. See supra note 1; see also supra note 20.
145. A notable exception is Neisser, supra note 85.
146. Different researchers have employed various terminologies and various classifications. See ANDREAS
KAPARDIs, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A CRrnCAL INTRODUCION 34 (1997) (listing examples of the different ways
researchers have classified eyewitness variables). This particular classification scheme is borrowed from Ralph
Norman Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting Events, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L.
1057, 1059 (2000).
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consistent with the testimony being given.
At first, it may seem that perceptual issues are not that significant for conversa-
tional memory. Conversational communications are usually directed to specific
participants and under conditions sufficiently conducive to accurate perception
(e.g., within earshot, in an otherwise quiet room). These thoughts, however, are
deceptive. The pressures from the adversarial trial system often demand that the
witness testify, not to the general communications, but rather to the particularities
of the conversation-at the level of specific words that were spoken. An eyewit-
ness to a robbery may have less than a minute to perceive the general physical
characteristics of a robber before he makes his escape, yet during the same minute
a listener to a conversation is likely to hear more than 140 words. 147 Thus,
significant perceptual issues remain for conversations.
Moreover, as discussed above, people are extremely bad at remembering the
surface structure of a conversation, partly as a result of the sheer quantity of
information (number of words) that must be processed. This is true even in
laboratory settings highly conducive to accurate recall and even when subjects are
explicitly forewarned about an impending memory task. 148 Memory for gist is
only slightly better, even when tested immediately after the conversation. 149 Given
that the typical trial occurs months or years after the original event, and that one's
primary purpose in everyday conversation is not to "remember," but rather to form
"impressions,"' 5 0 it would be most unusual for a witness to remember much more
than the common themes of a conversation. 1
51
2. Attention
At any conscious moment, a person is bombarded by myriad sensory stimula-
tions. If any of these are to be remembered, it must be encoded into memory, and
147. See Horabail S. Venkatagari, Clinical Measurement of Rate of Reading and Discourse in Young Adults, 24
J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 209, 221 (1999) (discussing the mean rates of speech in words per minute).
148. See Murphy & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 85; Sachs, supra note 79, at 99. But see Kintsch & Bates, supra
note 80, at 156 (finding some support for the alternative proposition that "sentence memory contains some traces
of the physical and linguistic features of the material").
149. See Stafford et al., Conversational Memory, supra note 63, at 220 (claiming that participants recalled only
10% of the content of their conversations); see also Bruck, Ceci & Francoeur, supra note 18, at 103 (reporting that
mothers were able to recall only about 35% of on-topic details and 25% of off-topic episodes from conversations
with their children); Laura Stafford & John A. Daly, Conversational Memory: The Effects of Recall Mode and
Memory Expectancies on Remembrances of Natural Conversations, 10 HuM. Comm. RES. 379, 393 (1984)
(reporting that subjects were able to recall only about 10% of a conversation 5-8 minutes after a relatively brief
interaction).
150. See Stafford et al., Actor-Observer Differences, supra note 62, at 605-06 (finding this true at least for
initial interactions); Stafford et al., Conversational Memory, supra note 63, at 207 (discussing how "global
impressions are more likely to be recalled than specific conversational events); Stafford & Daly, supra note 149,
at 393-94.
151. See generally Hyman, Jr., supra note 95, at 232; Neisser, supra note 85; and discussion infra Section
V.B.1.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 27 2007
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
for encoding to occur, the target must first be attended to.' 52 Without attention, it is
possible for events to occur directly in front of you, and yet leave no trace in
memory. A common illustration is a busy restaurant where one can hear the
conversation at a nearby table but pays no attention to it. Yet if the witness is
actually a participant in the conversation, no obvious reasons may at first come to
mind why it should be harder to attend to a conversation than to a visual target.
After all, conversations usually take place at a leisurely pace, and since appropriate
turn-taking is central to the progression of a conversation, each listener's attention
seems to be required by definition. Moreover, the five senses do not seem to be in
competition during a conversation to the same degree as they would be while
observing a crime.
Such distinctions, however, overlook the fact that the conversational stimulus
consists of much more than the words exchanged. Although mere words may be
exactly what counsel demands of the conversational witness, conversations are
inevitably a more complex form of discourse. 15 3 They contain many non-verbal
communications, which may be erroneously re-encoded at the perceptual level in
the witness's memory as explicit utterances.154 While sometimes harmless (e.g.,
pointing to a seat interpreted by the "listener" and subsequently re-encoded into
"have a seat"), other cases are not so clear-cut (e.g., nodding/sighing interpreted by
the "listener" and subsequently re-encoded into "I agree"/"that's too bad"). If the
witness were to testify accurately that the suspect nodded or sighed, then at least
the jury-however capable or not they may be to gauge the truth-could have the
opportunity to draw the appropriate inferences from such behavior. If, however,
the witness cross-modally encodes the nodding or sighing as the suspect having
uttered "good job" or "I'm disappointed," the jury is deprived of the facts from
which to possibly conclude otherwise.
3. Focus
Because one cannot attend to everything at the same time, attention is necessar-
ily selective. Many factors affect the attentional focus of the eyewitness. For
example, the presence of a weapon may overwhelmingly command the witness's
attention so that little else is encoded.
155
In the conversational context, there is no single counterpart to a weapon that
might similarly dominate the witness's focus. 156 Research has shown, however,
152. Fergus 1. M. Craik et a ., The Effects of Divided Attention on Encoding and Retrieval Processes in Human
Memory, 125 J. Exp. PSYCHOL. GEN. 159, 164 (1996).
153. See Edwards & Middleton, supra note 140, at 78-79; Molotch & Boden, supra note 87, at 280.
154. See Molotch & Boden, supra note 87, at 280.
155. See ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMEs M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESs TESmoltY: CtviL AND CRIMINAL § 2-12 (3d
ed. 1997).
156. Of course, if one of the conversational participants pointed a weapon, the witness could become just as
overwhelmingly focused on the weapon, to the detriment of his memory for other circumstances of the
conversational experience, including the content of the discourse. The same principle applies to other eyewitness
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that a person's reasons for engaging in a conversation largely determine whether
self-generated or other-generated statements will be better recalled. 157 Other than
in a few limited situations, such as acquaintance small talk or an interview,
t58
people usually approach conversations with a focus on the self. The consequence is
a reduced memory for other-generated statements. Thus, a conclusion that wit-
nesses could accurately remember what they themselves said in a conversation
would not warrant the conclusion that they accurately recall what the other
participants said. 
159
Moreover, as noted above, people are usually less concerned about the particular
statements uttered in the course of a conversation than they are about understand-
ing and comprehending the gist of the conversation. 160 In contrast, if an eyewitness
is aware that he is witnessing a crime and is not terrified by the display of a deadly
weapon, he is strongly motivated to observe the perpetrator's features closely and
to remember them because careful observation not only allows the eyewitness to




Eyewitness literature has shown that witnesses' schema about a particular event,
comprised of their expectations about what occurred and their understanding of its
meaning, are capable of significantly altering the report of what was actually
observed. For example, Allport & Postman had subjects view a still frame of two
men in an apparent argument, one of whom held a knife. 162 When the two men
were both white, subjects correctly recalled which man had held the knife.
163
variables as well. In other words, any time there is reason to doubt the reliability of the eyewitness account, and
any time a conversation is part of the experience about which the eyewitness is testifying, there is probably reason
to doubt the reliability of the conversational memory as well. Because this Article focuses on issues that are
unique to conversational memory, rather than factors that may compromise both eyewitness and conversational
testimony, however, the point is merely noted here.
157. See Neisser, supra note 85, at 277-83 (discussing the testimony of Dean during Nixon's trial and how his
expectations and biases were reflected in his testimony); Wolfgang Wagner, Recognition of Own and Others'
Utterances in a Natural Conversation, 10 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 596,597-98 (1984).
158. According to Stafford & Daly, "acquaintance small talks" are "necessary, but not memorable, social
rituals," such that "[tihe simple fact that [such an] interaction occurs may be far more important than what is
[actually] uttered." Stafford & Daly, supra note 149, at 394.
159. See Daniel Gilbert, Op-Ed., Who Cast the First Stone Probably Didn't, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2006, at A 11
(discussing a study that concluded that people remember what led them to make certain statements and how they
responded to statements made by their conversation partner).
160. See supra Section IfI.B.
161. Observers are pretty good at determining emotions from observing another's facial expressions. See Erika
L. Rosenberg & Paul Eckman, Conceptual and Methodological Issues in the Judgment of Facial Expressions of
Emotion, 19 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 111, 111 (1995).
162. GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947), cited in Haber & Haber,
supra note 146, at 1063 and in LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 155, at §§ 2-12, 33-34.
163. Haber & Haber, supra note 146, at 1063.
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When one of the men was black, however, both white and black subjects were
significantly more likely to incorrectly recall having seen the black man holding
the knife, even when the actual picture showed the knife held by the white man.164
The researchers viewed these results as evidence for the tendency of eyewitnesses
to encode and remember an event so as to be consistent with their beliefs,
stereotypes included, despite what they had actually observed. 
1 65
The potential for one's schema to alter memory is even greater for conversations
than for visual observations. Even if there are errors in the eyewitnesses'
memories, they are at least reporting about concrete and objectively "ascertain-
able" events in the world, for example, that there was a red car, that it was
speeding, etc. Conversations are much more complex. First, conversational state-
ments are multi-layered. In addition to the surface and gist of a statement, a speech
act conveys additional pragmatic information about the speaker, such as his
beliefs, intentions, and expectations.1 66 Moreover, because multiple surface forms
are possible to convey the same meaning, 167 and the same surface form may be
used for different meanings,168 conversational statements can be much more
ambiguous than the photograph in Allport & Postman's study. 169 A conversational
statement, if it is to make any meaningful sense, must be interpreted by the
listener: conversational statements inherently require filtration through the listen-
er's understanding of the context in which they are uttered.1 70 Hence, there are
more opportunities for schema-induced distortions in conversational memory than
in memory for visual observations.
B. Retention: Keeping the Original Memory
1. Decay
Once a memory trace is encoded, it must be preserved free from contamination
in order to be successfully retrieved later. Conversational memory, however,
suffers from extremely rapid decay. Although there are no studies on the relative
speed of decay for conversational versus eyewitness memory, nor on long-term
164. Id.
165. See LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 155, at § 2-12 at 33. Loftus & Doyle also report a study by Julian C.
Boon & Graham M. Davis, Rumors Greatly Exaggerated: Allport and Postman's Apocryphal Study, 19 CANADIAN
J. BEHAV. SCIENCE 430-40 (1987), which attempted to verify whether the racial stereotype was still true in 1987 by
replicating the procedure used by ALLPORT & POSTMAN, supra note 162. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 155, at
§§ 2-12, 34. Results showed that subjects who viewed a scene with a black man and a white man were still more
likely to commit memory errors, compared to subjects who viewed a scene with two white men. Id. Still, the
effects of the stereotype, while present, were not large. Id.
166. See supra Section Il.C.
167. See supra Section IlI.B.
168. See Kemper, supra note 78, at 367 (noting that the form, content and situational context of a statement all
contribute to its meaning).
169. ALLPORT & PosTMAN, supra note 162.
170. See supra Section II.D.
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conversational memory per se, there is little reason for optimism.
First, existing research shows that the already-less-than-perfect memory imme-
diately after a conversation undergoes significant decay even after relatively short
periods of time.1 71 Furthermore, decay and interference effects are greater for
complex stimuli 172 as certain details, especially those that are inconsistent with the
listener's schema, drop out while others, especially those that are schema-
consistent, are enlarged and emphasized.173 Since conversational discourse is
highly malleable and ambiguous, 174 decay and interference effects are likely to be
substantial. Thus, relative to eyewitness memory, conversational memory would
seem to be even more susceptible to decay and outright distortion over time.
2. Post-Event Information
One way a witness's initial memory may become distorted is by exposure to
post-event information. Such information can affect both the confidence 175 and
content 176 of the witness's recall. In a series of experiments designed to simulate a
situation in which a witness receives information from an interviewing police
officer about what another witness has already said, or a situation in which
multiple witnesses are interviewed together by a police officer, Shaw, Garven and
Wood showed that when subjects received incorrect information about a co-
witness's response, they were significantly more likely to themselves give that
incorrect response. 177 These effects persisted over time and despite the fact that the
subjects' answers were elicited anonymously, confidentially and in a written
for-mat. 178 Apparently, the subjects had come to genuinely believe the co-witness's
erroneous information as their own and thus incorporated it into their memory. 
179
In fact, the strength of the misinformation effect is such that simply asking
subjects to imagine an event can actually create-not just alter-a false memory.
Hyman and Pentland asked subjects whether they had memories of certain
171. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
172. Stafford et al., Conversational Memory, supra note 63, at 205.
173. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and
Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1103, 1131 (2004); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:
Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALm. L. REV. 1251, 1268-69 (1998); Myron Rothbart et al.,
Recalfor Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. ExPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 344-50 (1979).
174. Stafford et al., Conversational Memory, supra note 63, at 205.
175. See Luus & Wells, supra note 137 (discussing an experiment regarding how information obtained from
co-witnesses affects the subject's confidence levels); see also supra Section Il.F.
176. See John S. Shaw Um, Sena Garven & James M. Wood, Co-Witness Information Can Have Immediate
Effects on Eyewitness Memory Reports, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 503 (1997); see also supra Section IH.E.
177. Id. at 505.
178. Id. at 519.
179. Id.; see also Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May be Contagious, 4
Law & HUM. BEHAV. 323 (1980), cited in Shaw, Garven & Wood, supra note 176, at 504 (showing that
subject-witnesses "incorporated misleading details from another witnesses' written descriptions into their own
descriptions of target faces").
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unlikely events (e.g., spilling punch on the bride's parents at a wedding the
subjects attended when they were five years old). 180 At the first interview, very few
subjects claimed to remember the false event. After a few interviews, however,
15-25% of the subjects not only claimed that the event had happened, but actually
provided unprompted and vivid details of the experience that were never suggested
by the experimenters.181 When subjects were additionally required to form a
mental image of the false event during the original interview, this figure rose to
40%.182 This finding has dire forensic implications, for the experimental procedure
employed by Hyman and Pentland is quite analogous to that used by a police
investigator asking a witness to recreate a mental image of the crime scene and to
imagine the possibility of, for example, the presence of a gun, a fact that the
witness may not have originally recalled. 
1 83
The introduction of post-event information need not be so explicit for it to
contaminate memory. A witness's memory can be altered by things as subtle as the
use of a definite instead of an indefinite article, 184 the embedding of a false
assumption in a question,"' or even the particular verb used to describe the crime
scene. 186
While there are no studies specifically examining the effect of post-event
information on conversational memory, there is no reason to suppose that such
memory would be immune to similar contamination effects. This is particularly
180. Hyman, Jr., supra note 95, at 236.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 237.
183. See Giuliana Mazzonie and Amina Memon, Imagination Can Create False Autobiographical Memories,
14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 186 (2003) (discussing a study evaluating whether imagining false events can create false
memories). This "just imagine it" technique has become popular with some police interrogators when confronted
with a suspect who proclaims innocence. It often seems to end in a false confession. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson &
James A.C. MacKeith, False Confessions: Psychological Effects of Interrogation, in REcoNsTRuCING THE PAST:
Tim ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGISTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 253, 260-61 (Arne Trankell ed., 1982); D.J. Bern, Inducing
Belief in False Confessions, 3 J. of PERSONALrrY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 707; Gail Johnson, False Confessions and
Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. Pua. INT. L. J. 719
(1997) (discussing the methods police use that end up inducing false confessions). For a dramatic example, see the
interrogation of Peter Reilly in JOAN BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CA ,AAN 39-131 (1976).
184. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Guido Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of the Wording of a
Question, 5 BuLL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc. 86 (1975), cited in Shaw, Garven & Wood, supra note 176, at 504 (showing
that subjects who were asked whether they had seen "the broken headlight" were significantly more likely to
report having seen one, compared to subjects who were asked whether they had seen "a broken headlight" when
the videotape actually contained no broken headlights).
185. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Geoffrey R. Loftus, On the Permanence of Stored Information in the Human Brain,
35 AM. PSYCHOL. 409 (1980), cited in Haber & Haber, supra note 146, at 1069 (showing that subjects who were
asked whether they had seen "the red car stop or run the light just before the crash" were significantly more likely
to recall having encountered a red car, when in fact the car's color had not previously been specified).
186. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VEaAL LEARNiNG & VERBAL BEHAv. 585 (1974), cited in
Shaw, Garven & Wood, supra note 176, at 504 (showing that subjects' estimations of the speed of the cars
involved in a videotaped accident varied depending on whether they were asked, "How fast were the cars going
when they hit... smashed... collided.., bumped.., or contacted.., into each other?").
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likely in light of studies demonstrating that people are not good at remembering
the structure of a conversation (e.g., whether the information was given voluntarily
by the speaker or was an answer to a question), and more generally, at monitoring
the source of their information. 187 If anything, the fact that memory errors are most
often induced through a conversation 188 (e.g., between an examiner and a witness)
and that eyewitness memory may be contaminated by subtle details of language
(e.g., indefinite versus definite articles, different verbs with slightly differing
connotations such as "disliked" versus "hated" versus "abhorred", etc.) may be
taken as evidence of the fragility and malleability of conversational memory.
3. Repetition
Another source of concern for conversational memory comes from the research
documenting the effects of repeated similar events on memory. The principle is
best illustrated by a common example, parking every day in your workplace
parking lot.18 9 "Although the car and parking lot do not change, the particular floor
and location within the parking lot may differ from day to day."' 90 It is important
to remember where you parked your car today and to avoid confusing this
information with where you parked your car yesterday. To accomplish this, you
unconsciously but effectively erase from memory the details of where you parked
the day before.191
This may not be problematic for the eyewitness, since witnessing a crime is
usually not a routine occurrence. 192 Conversations, on the other hand, usually
involve communicating with familiar people in everyday non-traumatic circum-
stances, over prolonged periods of time and on multiple occasions. Therefore, it
becomes difficult to remember the details of any single conversation, such as the
exact date or precise context when a particular statement was uttered. Such details,
however, can be outcome-determinative, as discussed in Part II. Most witnesses
187. See, e.g., Bruck, Ceci & Francoeur, supra note 18, at 92 (discussing studies regarding subjects' inability
to remember from whom they obtained information).
188. See generally William Hirst & David Gluck, Revising John Dean's Memory, in ECOLOGICAL APPROACHES
TO COGNITION: ESSAY IN HONOR OF ULRIC NEISSER 253 (Eugene Winograd et al. eds., 1999), for an interesting
theory on how the very act of remembering an event (whether a certain day, a visual scene, or a past conversation)
within a conversation with others may shape the individual's subsequent recollections. More specifically, the
authors posit that the particular conversational roles (e.g. narrator, monitor, or facilitator) assumed by the
conversants structure the conversational remembering (i.e. highlights certain aspects and de-emphasizes others).
Id. at 260. This in turn can alter an individual's recollection of the event from what he would have remembered on
his own. Id. at 261.
189. See Haber & Haber, supra note 146, at 1070-71 (discussing how routines can alter memories).
190. Id. at 1070.
191. Id.
192. If, on the other hand, the encounter with the suspect appeared to be routine, as when the suspect makes a
purchase from a clerk in a store then, a few moments later, perhaps in the parking lot, commits a robbery, the
routine repetitiveness of the encounter in the store would make it difficult to recall the customer's features. See id.
at 1071.
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are likely to perform worse than John Dean, who co-mingled details from
September 15, 1972 and March 21, 1973.193
C. Retrieval: Recall at Trial
Legal, psychological and sociological scholars have all argued that requiring an
eyewitness to report the "objective facts" of an event at trial is fundamentally at
odds with how the witness originally processed the information. 194 It is precisely
when the witness is asked about details that were not originally a focus of the
witnesses' attention, they argue, that the most severe memory distortions occur.
195
This is because the witness will add content and details to reconstruct what "must
have happened."
The problem is even worse for conversations. While neither the eyewitness nor
the conversational witness can escape relying on their schemas, the latter is more
strongly influenced by personal goals and desires. 196 Whatever errors an eyewit-
ness may commit, the typical eyewitness has no motivation to purposely identify
the wrong person. In contrast, the typical conversational witness will have a closer
relationship to the defendant. Thus, relative to the "neutral" bystander witness, a
conversational witness is more likely to be influenced by subtle unconscious
motives arising out of the relationship which may influence his recall of a
particular conversation. This was clearly the case for John Dean, whose inaccura-
cies in recall reflected his desire to aggrandize himself as well as to shift blame
onto Nixon. 197 Sometimes, the witness's personal interests are more palpable, as
when conversational testimony is provided to law enforcement in expectation of
tangible benefits such as sentence concessions, immunity from prosecution or
money.
As intimated in Section Im.C, one important difference between eyewitness and
conversational testimony is that the task of the eyewitness is primarily to recognize
the defendant, whereas the task of the conversational witness is, or should be,1 98 to
recall, or recreate, the conversation-a much greater challenge to memory,
193. Neisser, supra note 85, at 282 and accompanying text.
194. Haber & Haber, supra note 146, at 1065-67 (discussing the different ways memories are altered);
Edwards & Potter, supra note 86, at 187; David Middleton & Derek Edwards, Conversational Remembering: A
Social Psychological Approach, in COLLECTrVE REmEMBERING: INQUIRIES IN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTON 23, 23-24
(David Middleton & Derek Edwards eds., 1990) ("Once we are removed from the confines of some very special
and formalized social occasions, such as court-room testimony and experimental studies of memory, many of the
well-known psychological distortions of recall, importation of inferences, schema effects, etc. come into their
own as functional and contextually sensible aspects of ordinary conversation."); see also supra note 86.
195. Haber & Haber, supra note 146, at 1066.
196. See supra Section IH.C.
197. See generally Neisser, supra note 85 and accompanying text.
198. As discussed in Part V infra, interviewers of conversational witnesses are legally free to suggest to the
witness what the conversation could or should have been and the task for the witness then becomes one of
recognition rather than recollection, and all an interviewer needs to do to create a recognition of a fictional
statement is to ask questions about it and then to revisit the subject later.
[Vol. 44:1
HeinOnline -- 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 34 2007
CONVERSATIONAL VERSUS EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY
whatever the subject to be remembered. Moreover, although eyewitness identifica-
tions in court are unreliable, the capacity to recognize familiar faces is, compared
with conversations, surprisingly good. In studies where subjects are shown a large
group of facial photos and later asked to distinguish between faces they have been
shown and new faces, they are accurate in distinguishing the two at a rate
approaching 90%. 199 The ability to recognize familiar words or passages, however,
is much inferior to face recognition.2 ° °
D. Juror Credulity
The tendency for jurors to believe in the accuracy of witnesses--especially
confident witnesses-is even more pronounced for conversational witnesses than
it is for eyewitnesses.
First, even if conversational remembering is an everyday occurrence, personal
experiences of its weaknesses may be infrequent. One gets very little feedback
after an autobiographical memory error,20 1 for big errors are relatively rare, and
"the world seldom gives feedback on smaller errors. Generally one has to get the
gist or tell an amusing story in order for the instance of remembering to be
considered successful. '20 2 Even when someone does receive negative feedback,
the feedback is often ignored or discounted, by assuming that it is the other
203
person's recollection that is in error, rather than one's own.
Second, even if jurors did have an accurate perception of the weaknesses of
conversational memory, this does not necessarily mean that they would be able to
apply such knowledge in their assessment of evidence. Penrod and Cutler noted
that although mock-jurors reported knowledge of several factors that would
199. See, e.g., Susan Carey, Becoming a Face Expert, in PROCESSING THE FACIAL IMAGE: PROCEEDINGS OF A
ROYAL SocIETY DISCUSSION MEETING HELD ON 9 AND 10 JULY 1991,95,95 (V. Bruce et al. eds., 1992); Ken Paller
et al., Electrophysiological Correlates of Recollecting Faces of Known and Unknown Individuals, 11 NEUROIM-
AGE 98, 98 (2000). How does one reconcile our ability to recognize familiar faces with our relative inability to
correctly identify people we have observed in the recent past? One difference is that the facial recognition studies
often separate the observation from the recall by minutes or hours whereas the eyewitness in a criminal case is
often not asked to identify the culprit for weeks or even months. During that delay, not only does memory decay,
but many corrupting influences are brought to bear on the witness's memory, inherent in the fact that the
investigators who seek identifications are almost always actively involved in the overall criminal investigation
and therefore often have suspects in mind as they interact with the witness. Source amnesia is also an often
overlooked factor. We can remember a face much better than where or when we saw it. Before a witness identifies
the defendant in court, she has often seen several photographs of the defendant and may even have seen him in
person in a showup or lineup. With each contact, his face looks more familiar and the source of that familiarity is
more and more likely to be thought to have been the crime scene rather than the previous exposures of photos and
faces. By the time the witness sees the defendant in the courtroom, he looks very familiar indeed and all doubts are
typically erased.
200. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 83, 199 and accompanying text (giving real
meaning to the phrase "a picture's worth a thousand words").
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substantially influence eyewitness performance, "jurors did not make even mini-
mal use of their purported knowledge" 2°4 when gauged by their actual behaviors.
Thus, the notion that jurors would provide an adequate safeguard against
unreliable conversational testimony by appropriately discounting such evidence is
difficult to sustain.
Despite the often quoted claim that cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,"2 °5 cross-
examination is ineffective in discrediting witness memory. Lindsay and colleagues
showed that even highly skilled cross-examination is virtually ineffective against a
live eyewitness.20 6 Lindsay taped sixteen eyewitnesses to a staged crime being
questioned by either experienced (actual lawyers with trial experience) or inexpe-
rienced (senior law students) lawyers for the prosecution and defense. 178 subjects
served as mock-jurors and attempted to detect the accuracy of the witnesses.20 7
Results showed that subjects believed the testimony of accurate and inaccurate
eyewitnesses at about the same rate (68% versus 70%). More important, the
lawyer's experience at cross-examination failed to influence the verdict. Even
experienced lawyers, free to question the witness as they chose, were unable to
lead mock jurors to believe an accurate eyewitness any more than an inaccurate
one, even when merely opposed by relatively inexperienced law students.20 8
However hard it may be for cross-examination to discredit an eyewitness, 20 9 it
should be even harder to discredit a seemingly neutral or disinterested conversa-
tional witness. With the eyewitness, there are accepted alternative techniques that
lawyers may employ. If available, the defense can introduce into evidence any
prior failures of the witness to identify the defendant, tentative identifications of
others, expressions of uncertainty or inability to identify, physical descriptions that
do not match the defendant and so forth. The defense may bring a forensic expert
to testify that the lighting at the time of the crime would have precluded a person
from getting a clear view of the perpetrator. They may inquire into any limitations
of eyesight or other perceptual difficulties the witness may have and may even
conduct experiments or demonstrations, in court and out of court, to refute the
eyewitness account. Because eyewitness accounts are based on some physical
reality of the event, third parties who were not present at the scene can sometimes
204. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 121, at 840 (reviewing studies comparing jurors' attitudes with their actual
behaviors).
205. JOHN H. WGMoRE, 5 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 29 (3d ed., 1940). For some different views,
see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) § 31 [hereinafter McCORMICK].
206. R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror BeliefofAccurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
333 (1989).
207. Id. at 334-36.
208. Id. at 338.
209. Id. at 333.
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dispute certain factors surrounding the witnessed event. 2t0 A conversational
account, however, is not amenable to similar challenges. Rarely is there evidence
that a witness could not have heard the statement he claims to remember, or that
the witness and defendant could not have conversed at all.
Eyewitness cases often involve multiple witnesses whose descriptions and
accounts can be compared. But the likelihood of there being multiple witnesses to
the same conversation is rather low, because most conversations, especially illicit
ones, take place among a small number of people. Thus, there is little hope,
sometimes present in eyewitness cases, that even if no single account is fully
accurate, the jury will be able to construct an accurate picture of what really
happened from multiple accounts.
To review the conclusions thus far: conversational testimony is important,
frequent, and largely ignored in the legal and psychological literature; however,
the accuracy of conversational memory is very poor and subject to both decay and
invention; further, in almost all respects, from encoding through recall, the
conversational witness is likely to be inferior to the eyewitness in terms of
accuracy, malleability, credibility and reversibility.
V. LEGAL RESPONSES TO EYEWITNESS VERSUS CONVERSATIONAL TESTIMONY
The American criminal justice system, while slow to respond to the extensive
data demonstrating the unreliability of eyewitness facial recognition testimony,
has finally begun to take some measures to reduce the dangers of false convictions
based upon eyewitness accounts. Under pressure from reformers and the relentless
revelations of false convictions, and mindful that eyewitness mistakes not only
threaten the innocent but protect the guilty, law enforcement agencies have begun
210. The use of extrinsic scientific data to dispute an eyewitness's testimony has a distinguished precedent that
predates any psychological studies on the general unreliability of eyewitness memory. Abraham Lincoln was once
asked by a friend to assist in defending her son against the charge of having murdered a man during a fight on the
evening of August 29, 1857. The following is an account from the trial:
[At trial] no very damaging testimony was elicited until a man by the name of Allen took the stand.
This witness, however, swore that he actually saw the defendant strike the fatal blow with a
slungshot [sic] or some such weapon; and Lincoln, pressing him closely, forced him to locate the
hour of the assault as about eleven at night, and then demanded that he inform the jury how he had
managed to see so clearly at that time of night. "By the moonlight," answered the witness
promptly. "Well, was there light enough to see everything that happened?" persisted the examiner.
The witness responded that "the moon was about in the same place that the sun would be at ten
o'clock in the morning and was almost full," and the moment the words were out of his mouth the
cross-examiner confronted him with a calendar showing that the moon, which at its best was only
slightly past its first quarter on August 29, had afforded practically no light at eleven o'clock and
that it had absolutely set at seven minutes after midnight. This was the turning-point in the case,
and from that moment Lincoln carried everything before him, securing an acquittal of the
defendant after a powerful address to the jury.
FREDRICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 232-33 (1906), quoted in JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALs 490-91 (3d ed. 1994).
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to adopt guidelines and procedures to reduce the impact of suggestion on
eyewitness memory and to improve the quality of facial recognition testimony.2"'
Some courts have also begun to admit expert testimony in eyewitness cases212 and
some have even adopted cautionary instructions to juries regarding the credibility
of eyewitnesses.213 There are no comparable safeguards where most conversa-
tional testimony is concerned. Such testimony is lumped generically with all other
testimony and no special instructions are given concerning the credibility of
conversational witnesses. In fact, the boilerplate instruction given regarding all
witnesses, which invites the jury to evaluate witness credibility on the basis of the
witness's demeanor,214 is probably counterproductive, since it has been well
established that demeanor evidence is worthless in determining whether a witness
is lying or mistaken.21 5
Another difference between eyewitness and conversational witness testimony is
that there are two layers of reliability concerns with conversational witnesses and
only one with eyewitnesses. Where identity is seriously contested, there are
usually no other important factual issues. Either the defendant raped, robbed or
killed the victim or someone else did. If the defendant contests identity, he cannot
as a practical matter contest the other facts of the case, such as claiming consent in
a rape case. In a prosecution where the conversational witness is important,
however, there are often two separate but overlapping issues as to which the
conversational witness's reliability may be determinative. The first level, the
reliability of the witness's testimony about the conversation itself-what was
actually said-has been the main focus of this article. However, when the uttered
statement is offered to prove that the assertions in the uttered statement are true,
there is a second layer of reliability concerns which are commonly associated with
211. See U.S. DEPr. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), www.ncjjrs.
gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf; see also CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2006), www.ccfaj.org/documents/
reports/eyewitness/official/eyewitnessidrep.pdf.; NEW JERSEY ATrORNEY GENERAL, ArORNEY GENERAL GUIDE-
LINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LvE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2001), www.state.
nj.us/lps/dcj/agguidetphotoid.pdf; WISCONSIN ATrORNEY GENERAL, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNEss
IDENTIFICATION (2005), www.dj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/eyewitnesspublic.pdf"
212. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208,
1220 (Ariz. 1983); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Mendoza 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000).
213. See State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) (finding that a special instruction was required
where a cross-racial identification was uncorroborated and identification presented a critical issue); LOFrUs &
DOYLE, supra note 155, at §§ 12-4 to 12-12, 333-43.
214. Jurors are routinely instructed that, in determining whether to believe a witness, they should take into
account the "demeanor and manner of the witness while testifying," CALJIC, supra note 51, at 2.20, or to "size a
person up in light of his or her demeanor," FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 117, at 7.01 (2004). See also
United States v. Moore, 978 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir. 1992) (discussing the jury instructions to consider "the
manner of the witness while testifying").
215. See Pager, supra note 123, at 380.
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the rule against hearsay.2t 6 However, as we noted in Part 1,217 the rule does not
prevent the uttered statement from being offered to prove its truth. For example, if
the witness quotes the defendant as saying, "I was there when JonBenet died," it is
admissible not merely to prove that the statement was made but that it is factually
true. The reliability of the inference (e.g., the defendant's guilt) that the uttered
statement is offered to prove depends on, among other things, how accurately the
conversational witness recalls the exact uttered statement (e.g., did the defendant
actually utter the words "I was there" or is the conversational witness merely
recalling the gist of the words that the defendant uttered, or perhaps just a general
impression?), what the defendant intended to communicate by the uttered state-
ment (e.g., was the defendant acknowledging that he was physically present and
involved in the victim's killing, did he mean he was in the general vicinity at the
time, or was he referring to some spiritual presence?), how well informed the
defendant was about the subject (e.g., did the defendant know where the crime
took place when he uttered the statement? Were the conversants talking about the
same victim and the same crime?), the defendant's motive in speaking (e.g., was
the defendant sincere, was he joking, and was he seeking personal publicity, was
he acting under duress or in response to fraud?). All of these factors comprise the
second layer of reliability concerns.
The law has long recognized the second layer of reliability concerns, but rather
than authorizing an inquiry into the circumstances relevant to the reliability of the
defendant's statement, the law simply bundles all these concerns into a single
inquiry: was the statement of the defendant "voluntary"? If the defendant's uttered
statement was voluntary, then it is admissible, and no special precautions or
cautionary instructions are deemed necessary.218 Under current law, however, the
voluntariness requirement amounts to little, since fraud and even some threats and
promises may be employed to acquire an admissible confession.219 Indeed, unless
coercion comes from police during custodial interrogation, even coercion may not
216. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 205, at §§ 244-50.
217. See supra notes 17-19.
218. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 205, §§ 146-147 (discussing the standard for voluntariness). In
some jurisdictions, if the judge determines that the confession was voluntary, she says nothing to the jury about
voluntariness. In others, the judge will instruct the jury to disregard the confession if they believe it was
involuntary. In a third, the judge solely determines voluntariness but advises the jury that it can give whatever
weight to the confession it thinks it deserves. Id. It is doubtful that the choice of approaches is very significant. See
Deeds v. People, 747 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Colo. 1987) (holding that instructing the jury to disregard an involuntary
confession was error, since only the judge should determine that issue, but the error was beneficial, not harmful to
the defendant).
219. See, e.g., McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 1988) (denying a habeas corpus petition on the
ground that defendant's confession was voluntary even though the defendant was wounded and officers
interrogated him with guns drawn); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894,903-04 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that a confession
was voluntary where police lied about the evidence they had, falsely threatened the suspect with the electric chair,
suggested he was mentally ill and promised psychiatric help); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding the defendant's confession was voluntary even though the police falsely told the suspect the victim had
not died when he had).
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render an incriminating statement inadmissible as "involuntary. 22 ° Confessions
are almost never excluded from evidence on the ground they are involuntary.221
Even if the criteria for determining voluntariness were more closely related to
reliability, the exclusionary rule would provide scant protection against erroneous
inferences from conversational testimony, for under almost any circumstances,
statements made out of court are capable of varying interpretations and their
reliability varies with unknown circumstances. That is why, after all, we have a
hearsay rule that keeps many out of court statements out of court. When statements
made by a defendant and offered against him, however, the two kinds of reliability
concerns, analytically distinct, collapse into one-whether testimony about the
uttered statement by or to the defendant was accurate and complete, both textually
and contextually. Except in those few jurisdictions that require videotaping of
interrogations, there are no substantial safeguards in place to assure the reliability
of a defendant's admissions, on either level of concern.
222
Worse, where the conversational witness is not a police interrogator but
someone else-a cellmate, a family member, a friend, a stranger who claims to
have overheard something incriminating-there is not even the very weak require-
ment of "voluntariness" to ameliorate the reliability concerns at the second level. If
one of these witnesses testifies that the defendant said something that appears to be
incriminating, such testimony will be admissible to prove not only what was said
but what the defendant intended, for example, that he was serious, well-informed
and uncoerced. As we have demonstrated, any testimony about what the defendant
actually said, if not simultaneously recorded, is highly suspect, and the possibility
of a full, complete, contextually rounded account of the conversations is virtually
nonexistent. Interrogators of such witnesses are free to employ suggestions, and
even fraud and threats, to get witnesses to recall what the interrogators desire them
to recall. Interrogators can fuel the witnesses' motivational biases by offering
criminal immunity, desirable plea bargains and money. Many of these contextual
circumstances will neither be recorded nor recalled by the witness. As with police
220. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 161, 167 (1986) (holding that because the defendant believed he
was ordered by God to confess, there was no police wrongdoing, and therefore the confession was "voluntary");
United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding ajuvenile's confession to police officers
when interrogated in the presence of his parents was voluntary); United States v. Rohrbach, 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th
Cir. 1987) (holding that it makes no difference if the suspect is drunk, on drugs, or mentally ill, in absence of
police coercion).
221. Professor Nardulli studied 7767 felony cases in three states. He found that confessions were ordered
suppressed in only 0.16% of such cases. See Peter Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 585, 593, 598 (1983). The grounds for suppression
presumably included not only involuntariness but inadequate Miranda warnings and illegal searches. Even
assuming that they were all based on involuntariness, the number of suppressions was quite small.
222. There is a common requirement that an admission or confession must be "corroborated" by other
evidence; conviction on a confession alone is not permissible. The burden on the prosecution, however, is not
onerous. One common formulation is "substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the
trustworthiness of the statement." Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954).
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interrogations of defendants, the reliability of conversational testimony produced
in the usual way, by witness "coaching," is suspect at the same two levels: what did
the defendant (or his agent) say? What should be inferred from what he said? There
are no protections to assure the reliability of such testimony at either level of
concern.
223
Even a blatant invitation to a witness to lie, or an unmistakable bribe or threat
will not render the resulting testimony inadmissible.224 Moreover, under federal
law, neither outright bribery nor threats are illegal unless they are committed by
representatives of the defense. 225 The prosecution does not do anything illegal
unless the pressures and consideration it brings to bear upon a witness are done
with a "corrupt" motive to produce false testimony.226 As long as witness
manipulators intersperse the mantra, "just tell me the truth," prosecutors are on
legally safe ground, and they know this.
An example of witness manipulation occurred in the prosecution of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg for espionage, a prosecution that resulted in the execution of both.
Ethel's brother, David Greenglass, testified that Julius gave him a Jello box cut in
half, to be used as a recognition signal by his spy contact, together with the
statement, "I come from Julius." Harry Gold later appeared, Greenglass swore,
with half of the Jello box and said, "I come from Julius." Gold gave similar
testimony. Gold's initial recollection, however, had been that he had told Green-
glass he brought greetings "from Ben in Brooklyn." Greenglass had also told his
attorney, "I didn't know who sent Gold to me." An FBI agent then brought Gold
223. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964), the Court ruled that for a codefendant to
interrogate the defendant while secretly transmitting the conversation to the Government was a violation of the
Sixth Amendment where the defendant had already been indicted. The Massiah concerns, however, have little or
nothing to do with reliability.
224. If the police suggest to the suspect that he lie to them and he "plays along" and says something that
context suggests he did not seriously mean to assert, the statement could conceivably be excluded as lacking any
probative value. Otherwise, however, invitations to witnesses to falsely incriminate someone else in a crime,
while clearly unlawful criminal solicitations, do not require that the witness who was thus solicited be precluded
from testifying, since that witness will take an oath and swear to tell the truth. He will, in short, insist that although
invited to lie, he resisted the invitation and is telling the truth.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2006) makes a felon of "whoever ... gives, offers, or promises anything of value
to any person, for or because of the testimony ... given or to be given by such person as a witness." No purpose to
elicit false testimony is required. A panel of the 10th Circuit held that § 201(c) prohibited any leniency or other
compensation to prosecution witnesses. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1358 (10th Cir. 1998). The
court reversed this decision on rehearing, holding that "whoever" does not include a representative of the
Government. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). One who gives or
promises something of value to a witness "corruptly" intending "to influence the testimony" of the witness
commits a more serious felony, involving possible imprisonment for 15 years. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) (2006). It is
not clear whether or not this provision applies to the Government but if it does, it most likely prohibits only
compensation for the purpose of eliciting testimony known to be false.
226. Witness coaching is apparently illegal only if done with a "corrupt purpose" to produce false testimony.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) (2006). Prosecutors and law enforcement personnel are virtually never prosecuted for
this because, among other reasons, mens rea is impossible to prove, especially if the mantra "just tell the truth" is
repeated from time to time when conversing with the witness.
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and Greenglass together to "iron out" the differences in their testimony. It took
several more interviews but just before the trial began, Gold became "quite
certain" that when he met with Greenglass he had brought greetings "from Julius."
An FBI agent who participated in the interviews admitted that he had made that
"suggestion" and he did not think that it was "wrong as such."2 27
Records are commonly kept about identification procedures, including the
photos employed in a photo spread or a photo lineup, and notes are made and
police reports prepared describing how the suspect was exhibited to the witness
and how the witness responded.228 If the procedures employed are not suggestive
and the witness makes consistent identifications, the pre-trial identification process
can strongly corroborate the witness's in-court identification. Hence, law enforce-
ment agents have an incentive to document the procedures. If it turns out that the
procedures were suggestive, defects in the process may be pointed out to the jury
to undermine the cogency of the identification. Since identification procedures
implicate possible constitutional violations,229 the failure to keep such records or
to disclose them to the defense is a suspicious practice which, although rarely aper
se violation of basic rules, can be called to the jury's attention with powerful
effect.230 There are no similar procedures in place for conversational witnesses.
While investigators normally make a report of any witness interview, they do not
ordinarily preserve their notes and their reports are highly selective, recording only
the statements of the witness that relate directly to the crime itself and constitute
evidence of the crime rather than evidence of innocence .23  Little is recorded
regarding peripheral discussions, contexts or motivations.232 Prosecutors often do
227. Atossa M. Alavi, The Government Against Two: Ethel and Julius Rosenberg's Trial, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1057, 1071 (2003).
228. Most criminal investigators make reports of significant investigative events. While they commonly record
only inculpatory events and leave out exculpatory evidence, see Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma 'am":
Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 18 (1993), any
interview of an eyewitness that produces a positive identification would clearly be something that police would
record, including a description of the interview, the photos displayed and so forth.
229. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977) (holding that suggestive eyewitness procedures
violate due process only if they result in unreliable identification).
230. There is no constitutional obligation to preserve evidence, e.g., by recording it or including it in a report,
unless the exculpatory value of the evidence is clear to the police and their destruction of the evidence (or failure
to preserve it) was "in bad faith." See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (finding no violation for
failure to refrigerate semen sample for testing by the defense in a rape case); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 491 (1984) (finding no violation for failure to preserve breath samples in drunk driving case). Nor are there
generally statutes or regulations which require police to record everything that is exculpatory. See generally
Fisher, supra note 228, at 18. But the police are expected to at least record identification procedures that result in a
positive identification. When such procedures were inadequately or misleadingly described in the report, this can
be effectively utilized on cross-examination. See Loirus & DoYLE, supra note 155, at 231-34 (discussing the
methods that defense attorneys should use in cross-examining police witnesses regarding the identification
procedures used).
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233not take notes when interviewing a cooperating witness, so they have no notes
to produce for the defense. Alternatively, they may take notes and withhold them
as "work product.,
2 34
The reliability of eyewitness testimony can be evaluated by examining the
procedures by which the eyewitness came to make a positive identification, by
evaluating the description the witness gave, photos displayed, length of time
between observation and identification, speed and certainty of the identification
and other relevant factors. The law has not developed any comparable system for
evaluating conversational testimony. Typically, a witness swears that a conversa-
tion occurred between certain people in a specified time and place, which may
have been months or years before the trial. The cross examiner is often in
possession of very little evidence about the witness and his or her motives for
testifying and very little detail about the circumstances under which the witness's
account came to the attention of the prosecution. Even prior contradictory
statements by the witness may go undisclosed if they were not in writing or
included in a police report.
Although pretrial discovery rules differ widely from state to state, and are
largely immune from constitutional scrutiny, 235 it is a common practice to disclose
the identity of any eyewitnesses in advance of trial and to include the photos
shown, records of responses and so forth in the discovery materials. It is hard to
imagine how the constitutional right to non-suggestive, reliable identification
procedures could possibly be vindicated without such discovery. Statements of a
conversational witness are less commonly disclosed. The Jencks Act 236 and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,237 forbid orders to disclose witness state-
ments before that witness has testified on direct examination at trial. Even the
233. Bennett Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 829, 852-53 (2002); Sam
Roberts, Should Prosecutors Be Required to Record Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74
FoRDHAM L. REv. 257, 268-69 (2005).
234, See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.30) (3d ed.
2000). Withholding of exculpatory evidence, even just impeachment evidence, may constitute a violation of the
prosecution's obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). However, courts generally hold
that exculpatory or impeachment information may be withheld so long as the withholding did not likely affect the
outcome of the trial. As a practical matter, the burden of proving the likely effect on outcome usually falls to the
defendant and courts rarely find that burden to have been met. See generally Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal
Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 541,561-73 (2006).
235. The Court has never held that pretrial discovery is required by Due Process. What is required is the
disclosure of "material" exculpatory evidence at such time as it can be effectively used by the defense. See Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused
who has requested it violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment). In theory,
failure to disclose some exculpatory material pretrial could be unconstitutional because disclosure at trial would
be too late for effective employment of the material. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. IsRAEL & NANCY J. KING,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 941-42 (4th ed. 2004) (noting due process may be violated where a prosecution's failure to
disclose certain material elements of its evidence before trial may deprive a defendant of an adequate opportunity
to prepare to meet the prosecution's case).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006).
237. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
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names of prosecution witnesses are protected from disclosure under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.238 Thus, in federal courts and in state courts that
follow the Federal approach, a conversational witness can actually appear at trial
as a surprise witness. 239 In such cases, the right of cross-examination is of little
value, especially if there are few or no investigative reports describing how and
when the witness first disclosed the alleged conversations about which he is
testifying and his degree of confidence when he first made the disclosure.24°
In eyewitness cases, courts have been required to evaluate the suggestive
procedures employed in the process of obtaining identifications and to preclude the
testimony of any eyewitness whose identification is unreliable due to improperly
suggestive procedures.241 While it is rare that an eyewitness is actually precluded
from testifying for this reason, the availability of this remedy doubtless acts as a
deterrent against unduly suggestive eyewitness procedures. Moreover, it legiti-
mates a judicial role in evaluating the reliability of eyewitness testimony. With
conversational witnesses (other than those concerning police interrogation), there
are no analogous procedures or practices. Courts are not obliged or authorized to
evaluate the reliability of conversational witness testimony or to exclude the
unreliable. There is no body of law dealing with the permissible and impermissible
limits of suggestion when preparing a conversational witness for trial.242 On the
238. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
239. These rules are so absurd that many federal judges, in the teeth of the statute and rules, order the
prosecution to disclose witness names and statements at least a day or two prior to the witness taking the stand.
Fairness aside, a sufficient reason for this "arm-twisting" of the prosecution is to save time. If the defense is truly
surprised by a prosecution witness, it has a good basis for requesting a continuance to prepare for cross-
examination. See HARRY I. SunuN, BARRY H. BERKE & ERIc A. TIRSCHWELL, THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 324-27 (2006) (noting that judges retain "a good deal of discretion in regulating
discovery" and most prosecutors do not wait to produce material relating to a witness because the prosecutor
knows the defense counsel will have a reasonable basis to request adjournment of the trial to review the material
and judges do not look favorably on such "avoidable delays").
240. Witnesses interviewed by the police are rarely asked during the investigative stage about how confident
they are in their memories of what they are reporting. Rather, confidence levels seem to be elicited only on the eve
of trial, when they are highly misleading. One reform that has been suggested for eyewitness identifications is to
request and record the witness's level of confidence in his identification at the time it is made rather than months
later. This would be a desirable practice with all witnesses. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMNSTRATION
OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING EYE WrrNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 5, rec. 6
(April 13, 2006), http://www.ccfaj.orgldocuments/reports/eyewitnesslofficialleyewitnessidrep.pdf ("At the con-
clusion of a lineup, photo presentation, or show-up, a witness who has made an identification should describe his
or her level of certainty, and that statement should be recorded or otherwise documented, and preserved.").
241. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14 (1977) (holding that suggestive eyewitness procedures
violate due process only if they result in unreliable identification); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43
(1969) (reversing a conviction of robbery after determining that the suggestive elements in a lineup "procedure so
undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due process").
242. A few courts have drawn the line at agreements that expressly condition the consideration to be paid to the
witness on his testifying to specified facts, e.g., to the guilt of X, or to producing another's conviction. See People
v. Medina, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 141-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the orders granting conditional immunity
to the three principal prosecution witnesses denied the defendants a fair trial where the witnesses were
accomplices of the defendants and had been placed under a strong compulsion to testify in a certain fashion by the
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contrary, if the testimony is relevant and the witness swears that he recalls it, it
must come in, no matter what the judge may think of it.
243
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
The primary purpose of this article is to raise awareness of and concern
regarding the largely ignored problem of conversational testimony. Long overshad-
owed by attention to eyewitness testimony, conversational testimony is in fact
more common, more likely to be inaccurate, more likely to be believed by jurors
and more likely to produce irreversible errors than eyewitness testimony. While we
must rely on conversational testimony so long as we seek to reconstruct past events
in litigation, we should also take steps to reduce the dangers of error in such
reliance.
The DNA revolution has dramatically demonstrated, as no scientific discovery
has before, that the American criminal justice system produces a large number of
false criminal convictions. Despite this fact, the trend over the past several decades
has been toward a greater and greater ease of criminal conviction and finality of
convictions. Appeals are less often successful today than they were a few decades
ago and successful collateral attacks (i.e., attacks on a conviction subsequent to
affirmance on direct appeal) are rarer still.244 Federal habeas corpus, once a
bulwark against wrongful convictions,245 has been stripped both by statute and
case law of much of its vitality.246 If a jury finds a defendant guilty today, that
verdict will almost certainly culminate in a final judgment of conviction. The
promises of conditional immunity). Cooperation agreements commonly condition the cooperator's compensation
on his "testifying truthfully" and also provide that the Government shall be the sole determiner of whether or not
the cooperator has done so. The difference is paper thin. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and
Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 51 (2000).
243. See FED. R. EvID. 402, 602. An Oklahoma court reversed a conviction and ordered the trial judge to
conduct a reliability hearing on an informant's testimony but then reversed itself on rehearing. See Dodd v. State,
993 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
244. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 353 (2006) ("As grim as the prospects look for obtaining relief based on an
innocence-based claim on direct appeal, the prospects are even grimmer thereafter."); Daniel S. Medwed, Up the
River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47
ARiz. L. REV. 655 (2005) (discussing the difficulty in litigating innocence claims predicated on newly discovered
evidence post-conviction).
245. See Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John Marshall Said it, Doesn't
Make it So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REv. 531 (2000) (analyzing the writ of habeas corpus and how
efforts to restrict the right may offend the Suspension Clause of the Constitution); Louis H. Pollak, Proposals to
Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956)
(discussing the strength of habeas corpus and proposals to curtail its power and use).
246. See Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights and Procedural Forfeitures: The
Delicate Balance, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 617 (1984) (discussing how federal courts deny habeas review because of
the defendant's failure to follow state procedural grounds for preserving the issue); James S. Liebman, An
"Effective Death Penalty "? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411,412-17 (2001)
(suggesting that rather than making the death penalty more effective, the result of the Antiterrorism and Effective
2007]
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severity of sentences has also greatly increased over the past several decades so
that a conviction is far more likely to lead to imprisonment, and if imprisonment
results, to a much longer term of imprisonment.247 Those wrongly convicted,
unless in the miniscule minority later cleared by DNA testing, are likely to suffer
more from a defective criminal process today than they did before the forensic
utility of DNA analysis was recognized.
DNA comparisons have shown that the wrong person was convicted of crime as
a result of bad lawyering, fraudulent or incompetent laboratory analysis, prosecu-
torial misconduct, mistaken identification, false confessions and the false testi-
mony of informants and snitches. 24 When we add the likelihood, supported by the
findings described in Parts III, IV and V, that many other innocents are convicted
of crimes committed by others or of crimes committed by no one because of false
conversational testimony, the complacent supposition that miscarriages of justice
are rare is simply unsupportable. The best that can be said of Judge Hand's famous
"ghost of the innocent man, 24 9 or its more modem manifestation in the railings of
Justice Scalia 250 is that they rest on ignorance. Our legal system, across the board,
does a poor job of separating the guilty from the innocent, or of determining
whether or not ambiguous conduct was criminal. Until we are willing and able to
substantially reduce the dangers of false convictions, we should adopt some
across-the-board ameliorations. There are many suggestions in the literature for
such reforms and we will not repeat or add to them here.25 t We would, however,
suggest some reforms that are directly related to the unreliability of conversational
testimony.
Death Penalty Act of 1996 has been to drastically hinder federal habeas corpus review of capital and non-capital
convictions).
247. See Steven Duke, Clinton and Crime, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 575, 576 (1993) ("Since 1980, the number of
Americans behind bars has tripled .... From 1980 to 1990, the number of prison years imposed upon defendants
annually by federal judges has increased tenfold."); A.B.A., JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT 15-17 (2004)
(noting that jail populations and the average length of time spent in prison have increased).
248. See DwYEP, NEUFELD & SCHECK ET AL., supra note 2, at app. 2 (charts and data regarding DNA
exonerations and factors leading to wrongful convictions).
249. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is
the archaic formalism and the water sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of
crime.
Id.
250. See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2539 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the possibility of
an innocent person being executed "has been reduced to an insignificant minimum").
251. See supra notes 2 and 20; see also Findley & Scott, supra note 244, at 354-98 (analyzing possible reforms
that might help the system perform more accurately and reliably); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 237 (discussing the issues raised by wrongful convictions and suggesting solutions to the
problems raised by the conviction of innocent individuals); Michael J. Saks et al., Model Prevention and Remedy
of Erroneous Convictions Act, 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 669 (2001) (suggesting reforms aimed at "reduc[ing] the
probability of erroneous conviction without reducing the probability of correct convictions").
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We should re-examine the way the hearsay rules institutionalize a bias toward
false convictions, since only incriminatory statements are admitted without impedi-
ment from the hearsay rules.252 The hearsay rules should be relaxed to permit
defensive use of hearsay in cases where the prosecution has relied on out-of-court
statements attributed to the defendant.253 This, however, would be counteracting
unreliable evidence with more unreliable evidence, a move which should be
approached with caution.254
There is much room for reform in the evidence gathering process, which, as
noted, operates virtually as a lawless jungle. Almost any amount of fraud, coercion
or other inducements can be employed in obtaining statements from a suspect or
statements and testimony about the defendant's statements from a witness. Given
that mere "suggestions" can significantly alter memory, the dangers are real.
Reconstructing what was said to the suspect by the police or the prosecutor as well
as what the suspect himself said typically rests on the credibility, including the
memory, of the participants.255 We need to require that interrogations of suspects
252. This is sometimes referred to as the "admissions exception" to the hearsay rule since a party's own
statements, offered to prove his guilt, meet all conventional definitions of hearsay (out of court assertions offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted). The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, state that a statement "is not
hearsay" if it is an admission by a party-opponent. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). Normally, hearsay exceptions are
based upon notions of trustworthiness. There is nothing especially trustworthy about a party's statements or else
they would be admissible regardless of which party offered them. The justification for admitting admissions is
obscure. As one text observes, "[o]n balance, the most satisfactory justification of the admissibility of admissions
is that they are the product of the adversary system .... MCCORMICK, supra note 205, at 448. In other words, that
is just the way it is. It is hard, in any event, to imagine how the guilty could be effectively prosecuted without
relying on defendant's admissions.
253. Under existing rules and practices, an out-of-court statement that would otherwise be hearsay may be
admitted if it tends to disprove the making of a contradictory statement that has been introduced by the
prosecution. For example, if the prosecution offered testimony that the defendant told the witness, "I have always
admitted that I was guilty," the defense could probably introduce, despite a hearsay objection, evidence that the
defendant told someone, before he allegedly made the previous statement, that he was not guilty. The theory of
admissibility would be that the second statement, being inconsistent with the first, tends to prove that the first
statement was not actually made. Without the close linkage of the two statements, however, the denial of guilt
would normally be excluded as hearsay while the admission would come in.
254. Although the "admissions exception" allows relevant statements made by the prosecution to be
introduced by the defense over hearsay objections, courts resist applying the exception when the defense seeks to
take advantage of it. See, e.g., United States v. Van Dom, 925 F.2d 1331 (1lth Cir. 1991). In Van Dorn, the
prosecution witness testified that he was in the fish business and was asked on cross-examination if he was ever in
the narcotics business. He said no. Defense then offered to prove that the prosecutor had sought to have the
witness's bail revoked on the ground he was "the biggest drug dealer in Broward County" and that while on appeal
from his drug conviction, he had threatened the life of the prosecutor and sought a contract on the life of the
district judge. Id. at 1335. The Court held that the statements of the prosecution about its witness were not
admissible: "There is simply no rule of evidence which allows the admission of statements made by an attorney in
the course of a judicial proceeding as proof of the matters asserted in the statement." Id. at 1335-1336. But see
FED. R. EvID. 801(d )(2), which provides that a statement is not hearsay if "offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth."
255. And, of course, the defendant is at a severe disadvantage in a "swearing contest" with the police, and the
prosecution witness stands to gain from pleasing the prosecution. The State pays no compensation to witnesses
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be videotaped, as they are in England 256 and in a handful of States.257 The jury
should at least be permitted to observe the process by which a confession was
obtained. Videotaping will reduce the likelihood that police will otherwise inaccu-
rately or incompletely recall their conversations with the defendant. A recent study
concluded that the benefits of recording interrogations are substantial and that
legitimate law enforcement interests are not disadvantaged.25 8
Considering the almost infinite and hence unpredictable sources from which
conversational witnesses can emerge and the many stages-from perceiving,
interpreting and encoding to recall-at which inaccuracy in conversational memory
may arise, the fact that federal and some state courts still allow "surprise"
prosecution witnesses, effectively precluding any opportunity for defense counsel
to investigate the memory's provenance, is fundamentally unfair. This antiquated
procedure is sometimes justified by the argument that the defendant might
intimidate or harm the witness if the witness's identity is known in advance.259
Such intimidation, however, is extremely rare and there are many other ways to
guard against that remote possibility. 260 Restrictions on disclosure of witness
names and witness statements should be eliminated; instead, the procedures of
many States which routinely disclose both witness names and their statements in
advance of trial should be uniformly adopted. Both written and oral statements
should be disclosed, along with the time and circumstances under which the
statements were uttered and elicited.261
The testimony of snitches and co-conspirators about what defendants are
alleged to have said to them is commonly acknowledged as problematic, and a
major source of false convictions.262 Two Canadian Commissions have recom-
who help establish a defendant's innocence, only to those who help convict him. This should be changed. See
Harris, supra note 242, at 49-50.
256. England has been requiring recording for more than twenty years. See Johnson, supra note 183, at 745.
257. See Steve Drizin & Richard Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L.
REv. 891, 998 (2004) (noting that only Alaska, Minnesota, and Illinois require the electronic recording of police
interrogations).
258. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 26-27 (2004), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/
SullivanReport.pdf.
259. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 541, 583 (2006).
260. See Cary Clennon, Pretrial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the Administration
of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. Rv. 641, 662-64 (1989)
(arguing that witness tampering is limited to certain types of cases and even in those types it rarely occurs).
261. The ABA recommended disclosure of witness lists and witness statements nearly forty years ago, A.B.A.,
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL § 2.1(a) (Approved Draft, 1970), and the Supreme Court adopted such reforms and submitted them to
Congress for approval. See Clennon, supra note 260, at 653. Prosecutors objected, however, and the provisions
were deleted by Congress. Id. at 654.
262. See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 2, at app. 2 (finding that in 62 DNA exonerations, there was
false testimony by an informant or a snitch in 15 of the cases). The testimony of jailhouse snitches is commonly
considered a problem only of mendacity, since the snitch is a criminal who is looking for a way to reduce his
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mended significant reforms in the use of snitches in Canada,2 63 but there is little
reform taking place below the Canadian border. Among the Canadian Commis-
sions' recommended reforms are: (i) in-custody snitches should rarely be used, and
only in cases where there is a compelling public interest in receiving their
testimony and such testimony is corroborated; (ii) in addition to corroboration,
there should be confirmatory evidence that significantly demonstrates that the
inculpatory aspects of the proposed testimony was not fabricated; (iii) the
proposed testimony should be evaluated by supervisory prosecutorial authority
and found to be reliable; (iv) any negotiations of benefits to be conferred on the
snitch in exchange for testimony should be conducted by counsel not directly
involved in the prosecution and all agreements, including benefits conferred,
should be in writing; (v) no benefits should be conditioned upon convictions; (vi)
details of all previous (and possibly contradictory) testimony by the snitch should
be disclosed; and (vii) all contacts between police or prosecutors and snitches must
be videotaped or audiotaped.26 While some of these practices might appear
commonsensical, none of them is common in the United States. The Canadian
experiences under these reforms have been positive and effective law enforcement
has not seriously suffered.265 American courts should adopt some or all of the
Canadian policies.266
As we have shown, the virtually unregulated arena of evidence gathering and
trial preparation is fraught with great danger to the innocent, and small seeds of
suggestion to witnesses can quickly grow into exquisitely detailed but erroneous
sentence and many snitches are very clever in fabricating confessions which they attribute to a fellow prisoner and
then seek a payoff from the prosecution for testifying about the non-existent confession. It might be thought that
willful fabrication of a nonexistent conversation, problematic though it is, is not relevant in an analysis of
problems of conversational memory. However, studies suggest that even where a story begins as a willful,
conscious fabrication, it can often end up, by virtue of repetition and reinforcement, as a finn belief. In a recent
study, subjects were first asked if certain things had ever happened to them. They were then told to lie and say that
what had not happened to them had in fact happened, and they were encouraged to fabricate stories to convince
others of the truth of the lie. Surprisingly, 10% of the subjects, only one week after commencement of the
experiment, came to believe completely that their lies were in fact true. That percentage increased to 16% five
weeks after a similar experiment. See Danielle C. Polage, Fabrication Deflation? The Mixed Effects of Lying on
Memory, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 455, 457-60 (2004). Moreover, if there is a kernel of truth to what the
snitch initially reports, virtually all the studies considered in this article suggest he will embellish with highly
incriminating material, which he may believe, if his interests and those of his interrogators are supportive.
263. See PETER DE C. CORY & THOMAS SOPHONOW, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW: THE
INVESTIGATION; PROSECUTION & CONSIDERATION OF ENTrTLEMEr TO COMPENSATION (2001), available at
http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/recommendations/english.html#jailhouse; FRED KAUFMAN,
THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GuY PAUL MORIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1998), available at http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin-recom.pdf.
264. See KAUFMAN, supra note 263, at 12-13, 15-16, 17, 21; see also DE C. CORY, supra note 263.
265. Several provincial governments have adopted many of the recommendations in the Canadian reports,
with good results. See MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 96-103. Many of the recommendations in the
Canadian reports were reaffirmed by a group of prosecutors who produced the report on preventing miscarriages
of justice. See id. at 103-06.
266. Many similar reforms have been suggested for the United States in SyMPOSIum: THE COOPERATING
WITNESS CONUNDRUM: IS JUSTICE OBTAINABLE?, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 747 (2002).
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accounts of incriminating statements. We should impose guidelines on the inter-
viewing of witnesses by police and prosecutors, especially once their target
suspect has been arrested or charged.267 In addition, we should require that such
interviews be recorded and made available to the defense before trial. If the
guidelines are not followed or the interviews not recorded, the judge should have
authority to exclude the testimony of the witness in egregious cases or, at a
minimum, to give a jury instruction authorizing an inference adverse to the
268prosecution.
The Supreme Court during the Earl Warren era found due process violations in
suggestive eyewitness identification procedures and Sixth Amendment violations
in conducting lineups without defense counsel in cases in which the defendant had
already been charged. 269 As noted earlier, the Department of Justice has adopted
guidelines aimed at reducing the suggestibility of eyewitness identification proce-
dures as have some State law enforcement agencies. Trial judges should exclude
unreliable conversational testimony in the same way they exclude identification
testimony-it may have been so suggestively gathered or its provenance so
suspiciously undocumented as to be essentially worthless. Although some courts
have applied psychologically informed restrictions on the admissibility of conver-
sational testimony of children,27° whose suggestibility is more widely recognized,
these restrictions and other exclusionary remedies should be applied to adult
267. It is at that point that the "adversary process" has kicked in, and the emphasis is not on investigating an
unsolved crime but on convicting the person believed to be guilty. At that point, expecting objectivity from law
enforcement personnel may be unrealistic. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,492 (1964) (holding "that when
the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory" the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer).
268. Many of these suggestions are made in Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23
CARDozo L. REV. 829 (2002). Since erroneous conversational testimony implicating a defendant in a crime, in
contrast to erroneous eyewitness testimony, will rarely immunize a different but guilty person, it is unlikely that
much cooperation in reform efforts will be received from law enforcement personnel, such as has been generated
in the eyewitness context. Courts, however, should extend the constitutionally-based duty to preserve exculpatory
evidence, to require that interviews and conversations with important witnesses be preserved, either by recording
or by detailed notes, if recording is impractical, and that such notes be kept and disclosed to the defendant prior to
trial. Compare California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (declaring that law enforcement has no
constitutional duty to preserve potential exculpatory evidence), and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988) (holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law."), with Stephan v. State, 711 P. 2d
1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (holding that under the Alaska Constitution, Due Process requires that evidence of an
interrogation be preserved by recording).
269. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1969) (holding that the suggestive elements in a lineup
procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due process); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-41 (1967) (holding that if the accused is denied her right to counsel at the lineup, the
prosecutor is prohibited from obtaining an in-court identification of the accused by the witness, unless the
prosecutor proves by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is not a fruit of the tainted
lineup).
270. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1376-83 (N.J. 1994) (discussing the admissibility of conversational
testimony of children); see also Robert Rosenthal, State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An Overview,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 246 (1995) (discussing the Michaels case and how the erroneous conversational
testimony of preschool age children helped convict the defendant).
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testimony as well.27 1
Increasingly, courts are willing to give cautionary instructions on the risks of
eyewitness misidentification 272 and a few even give the jury a primer on the
psychology of eyewitness identification.273 There appears to be a slight trend
toward admitting expert testimony in eyewitness cases.2 74 Where the prosecution's
case rests significantly on unrecorded statements attributed to a defendant by
prosecution witnesses, the same kinds of instructions should be given and expert
testimony should be admissible.275 Whatever safeguards and remedies are appro-
priate for doubtful eyewitness identifications are not only appropriate but even
more urgently needed for doubtful conversational testimony.
The DNA revolution and the exonerations it has produced have stimulated a
broad interest in examining the causes of miscarriages of justice in the United
States and elsewhere. However, no fundamental reform of criminal procedure has
yet occurred in the United States as a result of that renewed interest in innocence.
Unless significant changes are made in the criminal process, we can be certain that
most of the miscarriages of justice exposed by DNA will continue, only we won't
be able to identify them. DNA-based exonerations will subside as DNA compari-
271. The Canadian Commissions recommend that a judge should exclude testimony of an in-custody
informant which appears to the judge to be unreliable. Similar recommendations have been made for the United
States. See Harris, supra note 242, at 63-64. We see no reason why such reliability requirements should not be
applied to all important conversational testimony.
272. See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 316 (Conn. 2005) (requiring cautionary instruction where
photo or lineup was used and witness was not told that culprit might not be in the array). Most American courts
give only what is known as the "elfaire instruction," so named after the 1972 decision of the D.C. Circuit which
first proposed it. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (providing a model
instruction that calls the jury's attention to some factors that it ought to consider in evaluating eyewitness
testimony, such as opportunity to observe the culprit, possible influence of the police on the witness's memory and
so on). This instruction stops short of advising the jury that eyewitnesses are often mistaken and its beneficial
effects are doubtful. See Brian Cutler et al., Nonadversarial Methods for Improving Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197 (1990). A true cautionary instruction that not only
informs the jury of the risk of eyewitness misidentifications but identifies and explains the psychological factors
that affect eyewitness reliability is still rarely required in the United States. The California Supreme Court held
that the failure to give such an instruction was reversible error in People v. Wright, 729 P.2d 280, 296 (Cal. 1987),
but then reversed itself on rehearing. 755 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1988) (endorsing a Telfaire instruction instead). See
generally LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 155, at §§ 12-4-12-12, 333-43.
273. See State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953, 961 n.5 (Utah 2002). As with most other reforms to protect the
innocent, the lead in this regard has been taken by Canada, which routinely gives such instructions in eyewitness
cases. See, e.g., R. v. Mezzo, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802, 845 (Can.); R. v. Carey [1996], 113 C.C.C. (3d) 74, 79-80
(Can.).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208,
1220 (Ariz. 1983); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000); see generally LoFrvs & DOYLE, supra note 155.
275. In the recent trial of Lewis "Scooter" Libby for lying to the FBI and the grand jury about where he learned
about Valerie Plame's association with the CIA, the defense contended that Libby didn't lie, he forgot where he
learned this information and with whom he had discussed it. The defense attempted to call a psychologist to testify
about conversational memory but the trial judge refused to admit it. This will presumably be an issue in Libby's
appeal. See Elizabeth L. Loftus & Richard L. Steinberg, IfMemory Serves, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007 (arguing that
the judge's ruling was erroneous).
HeinOnline -- 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51 2007
AMERicAN CimuiNAL LAW REvIEw
276sons become a part of preliminary police investigations. Once this window of
awareness is closed, it is unlikely that the much larger potential for wrongful
convictions through false conversational testimony will be recognized and re-
sponded to. Those opposed to change will once again ascribe the possibility of
convicting the innocent to the watery speculation of radicals and revolutionaries. If
substantial reform is to take place, it must be soon.
276. DNA exonerations appear to have peaked in 2001. See The Innocence Project, supra note 2.
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